The Phenomenal Intentionality Research Program

Kriegel, Uriah

doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199764297.003.0001

Cited by 115 publications

(66 citation statements)

References 32 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Unclassified

Order By: Relevance

“…It therefore approaches the issue of how the unconscious thoughts that we intend to express relate to the conscious thoughts that we have by exploring the idea that conscious thought contents have a degree of determinacy that unconscious thought contents lack (Crane, 2017). This route would resemble those phenomenal intentionality views that are committed to a disanalogy between conscious and unconscious thoughts, even if for reasons different from ours (see Kriegel, , for a survey of positions). The idea that we want to scrutinize is that thought content needs to be brought to consciousness for its content to be fully determined.…”

Section: Aborted Inner Speech and Thought‐content Individuationmentioning

confidence: 52%

“…(For a version of this argument applied to cognitive attitudes, see Jorba (2016)). 6 Accounts of the general determinacy claim have been defended by Loar (1995), Horgan and Tienson (2002), Graham et al (2007), Horgan and Graham (2012), Kriegel (2014) and Farkas (2008), among others (see Kriegel, 2014, for an overview). There has also been resistance to the claim that thought content is phenomenally individuated (see, e.g., Wilson, 2003;Pautz, 2013).…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In recent years, the phenomenal intentionality program has garnered interest within the philosophical debate surrounding intentionality. Phenomenal intentionality is intentionality that can be attributed to a mental state, purely in virtue of its phenomenal character (Kriegel, : 2). Different views of how to describe and explain such intentionality stress, in one way or another, a close connection to (phenomenal) consciousness: the so‐called ‘inseparatism’ claim (Horgan and Tienson, ).…”

Section: The Indeterminacy Problem: Phenomenal Intentionality Vs Natmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 2 more Smart Citations

The Linguistic Determination of Conscious Thought Contents

Vicente

Jorba

2017

Nous

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

In this paper we address the question of what determines the content of our conscious episodes of thinking, considering recent claims that phenomenal character individuates thought contents. We present one prominent way for defenders of phenomenal intentionality to develop that view and then examine ‘sensory inner speech views’, which provide an alternative way of accounting for thought‐content determinacy. We argue that such views fare well with inner speech thinking but have problems accounting for unsymbolized thinking. Within this dialectic, we present an account of the nature of unsymbolized thinking that accords with and can be seen as a continuation of the activity of inner speech, while offering a way of explaining thought‐content determinacy in terms of linguistic structures and representations.

show abstract

Section: Aborted Inner Speech and Thought‐content Individuationmentioning

confidence: 52%

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: The Indeterminacy Problem: Phenomenal Intentionality Vs Natmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

The Linguistic Determination of Conscious Thought Contents

Vicente

Jorba

2017

Nous

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…13 See, for example, Chalmers (2002aChalmers ( , b, 2004Chalmers ( , 2006, Jackson (1998aJackson ( , b, 2007, and Soames (2005). 14 See Kriegel (2013b) and the papers contained in . first articulated the object.…”

Section: Empirical Realism Entails Intentional Internalismmentioning

confidence: 99%

Intentionality and Realism

Fiocco

2015

Acta Anal

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

In this paper, I argue that how a mind can come to be about an object and how the world is independently of the workings of any mind are inextricably linked. Hence, epistemology, at its most basic, and metaphysics are systematically related. In order to demonstrate the primary thesis of the paper, I first articulate two contrary accounts of the nature of reality and then two contradictory general views of intentionality. I argue that these positions can be combined in only two ways. This argument turns on the impossibility of there being an object that cannot, in principle, be thought of or referred to, so I present reasons for thinking such a thing cannot exist. The upshot is that there are but two intentional-cum-ontological positions, that is, two unified positions regarding how a mind relates to the world and what the world is like in itself. This might be surprising, for one might have thought that the views in the different domains were independent; it is significant, because it shows that views that might have seemed related by mere affinity are, in fact, necessarily conjoined. I conclude by presenting reasons for thinking one of the two intentional-cum-ontological positions is untenable.

show abstract

“…For my own take on the matter, see Kriegel Chs 1–3. For a partial survey of work on this notion, see Kriegel forthcoming.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Towards a New Feeling Theory of Emotion

Kriegel

2011

European J of Philosophy

Self Cite

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

According to the old feeling theory of emotion, an emotion is just a feeling: a conscious experience with a characteristic phenomenal character. This theory is widely dismissed in contemporary discussions of emotion as hopelessly naïve. In particular, it is thought to suffer two fatal drawbacks: its inability to account for the cognitive dimension of emotion (which is thought to go beyond the phenomenal dimension), and its inability to accommodate unconscious emotions (which, of course, lack any phenomenal character). In this paper, I argue that the old feeling theory is in reality only a pair of modifications removed from a highly plausible account of the nature of emotion that retains the essential connection between emotion and feeling. These modifications are, moreover, motivated by recent developments in work on phenomenal consciousness. The first development is the rising recognition of a phenomenal character proper to cognition-so-called cognitive phenomenology. The second is the gathering momentum behind various 'connection principles' that specify some connection that a given state must bear to phenomenally conscious states in order to qualify as mental. These developments make it possible to formulate a new feeling theory of emotion, which would overcome the two fatal drawbacks of the old feeling theory. According to the new feeling theory, an emotion is a mental state that bears the right connection to conscious experiences with the right phenomenal character (involving, among other elements, a cognitive phenomenology).

show abstract

The Phenomenal Intentionality Research Program

Cited by 115 publications

References 32 publications

The Linguistic Determination of Conscious Thought Contents

The Linguistic Determination of Conscious Thought Contents

Intentionality and Realism

Towards a New Feeling Theory of Emotion

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About