The Persistence of Epistemic Objects Through Scientific Change

Abstract

Why do some epistemic objects persist despite undergoing serious changes, while others go extinct in similar situations? Scientists have often been careless in deciding which epistemic objects to retain and which ones to eliminate; historians and philosophers of science have been on the whole much too unreflective in accepting the scientists' decisions in this regard. Through a re-examination of the history of oxygen and phlogiston, I will illustrate the benefits to be gained from challenging and disturbing the commonly accepted continuities and discontinuities in the lives of epistemic objects. I will also outline two key consequences of such rethinking. First, a fresh view on the (dis)continuities in key epistemic objects is apt to lead to informative revisions in recognized periods and trends in the history of science. Second, recognizing sources of continuity leads to a sympathetic view on extinct objects, which in turn problematizes the common monistic tendency in science and philosophy; this epistemological reorientation allows room for more pluralism in scientific practice itself.

The Scientific Use of Technological Instruments

“…Also see Boon (forthcoming), in which I analyze the controversy between Pickering (1984) and Hacking (2000) on the question of to which extent the entities in successful theories are inevitable or contingent. As an alternative to Hacking's realism, I propose epistemological constructivism, which is in alignment with those of Chang (2009b) and Rouse (2011). observations are at variance with empirically known behaviour, thus pointing at a new kind of physical phenomenon. Finally, formation of a theoretical concept of a phenomenon involves interpreting the experimental observations by employing relevant conceptual, empirical and theoretical background knowledge.…”

“…(1) how theoretical concepts are formed in experimental practices, (2) how the formation of scientific concepts goes hand-in-hand with the development of technological instruments (e.g., Feest, 2008Feest, , 2010Feest, , 2011, (3) how theoretical concepts themselves play a role in investigating the phenomena to which they supposedly refer (e.g, Feest 2008, 2010, and Boon 2012, and conversely (4) how material objects are the driving forces in the process of knowledge acquisition (e.g., Rheinberger 1997, Chang 2009b, and also, (5) how in these processes phenomena and theoretical concepts get stabilized (Chang 2009b, Feest 2011). Following up on these ideas, I have proposed that the formation of theoretical concepts involves interplay between experimental observations and 'partial' conceptual, empirical and theoretical knowledge of the working of an instrument or experimental set-up.…”

Explaining the laser’s light: classical versus quantum electrodynamics in the 1960s

“…Instead, they were claiming that the phenomenon they had exhibited 6 See Milonni (1984). 7 Hasok Chang makes a plea for this sort of situation in Chang (2011). could be explained by a deterministic wave theory as well as by a stochastic corpuscular one. They referred to the 1909 paper in which Einstein had calculated the fluctuations in the energy contained in a small portion of a cavity filled with thermal radiation.…”

Remembering (Short-Term) Memory: Oscillations of an Epistemic Thing

“…Therefore, the experimental effects produced by particular experimental paradigms cannot be appealed to when trying to fix the reference of a particular theoretical term. In this respect I part ways with approaches in the literature that argue that the continued use of particular experimental techniques suggests continuity of reference through theoretical change (Arabatzis 2006;Arabatzis, 2011;Chang, 2011).…”