2011
DOI: 10.1007/s10670-011-9341-8
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Remembering (Short-Term) Memory: Oscillations of an Epistemic Thing

Abstract: This paper provides an interpretation of Hans-Jörg Rheinberger's notions of epistemic things and historical epistemology. I argue that Rheinberger's approach articulates a unique contribution to current debates about integrated HPS, and I propose some modifications and extensions of this contribution. Drawing on examples from memory research, I show that Rheinberger is right to highlight a particular feature of many objects of empirical research (''epistemic things'')-especially in the contexts of exploratory … Show more

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Cited by 18 publications
(18 citation statements)
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References 43 publications
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“…Rheinberger himself stands for a strand within the philosophy and history of experiment that has sought to analyze the dynamics of knowledge production, focusing his attention on the material and cognitive resources with which scientists navigate what is not known. (see also Feest, 2012;Feest & Steinle, 2016).…”
Section: Two Objectionsmentioning
confidence: 96%
“…Rheinberger himself stands for a strand within the philosophy and history of experiment that has sought to analyze the dynamics of knowledge production, focusing his attention on the material and cognitive resources with which scientists navigate what is not known. (see also Feest, 2012;Feest & Steinle, 2016).…”
Section: Two Objectionsmentioning
confidence: 96%
“…This account of how classification proceeds in science is highly idealized; if natural kinds are ultimately the goal of science, investigations into the nature of scientific practice reveal that classificatory practices and kind discovery in science do not follow this logical trajectory (e.g., Andersen, 2010;Bloch-Mullins, 2020a, 2020b, Chang, 2004Hacking, 1992b;Feest & Steinle, 2012;Kendig, 2016aKendig, , 2016bNersessian, 2008). Numerous philosophers of science and scientists have noted that exploratory and hypothesis-driven research often proceed in science without a firm grasp of what the objects of inquiry are nor how the kinds of things under study fit into some broader taxonomy of kinds (e.g., Anderson, 2015;Brigandt, 2003Brigandt, , 2020Chang, 2004Chang, , 2012Colaço, 2020;Feest, 2005Feest, , 2010Feest, , 2011Feest, , 2012Feest, , 2017Feest & Steinle, 2012;Griffiths, 1997Griffiths, , 2004Haueis & Slaby, 2017;Kendig, 2016aKendig, , 2016bMuszynski & Malaterre 2020;Rheinberger, 1997;Sullivan, 2009, 2017b, Sullivan, 2010Sullivan, 2019;Sullivan, 2020).…”
Section: Scientific Practice Coordinated Pluralism and Coordinated Kmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Material recovered from the site is added to artifacts that were originally recovered, reinforcing the notion that the collection is a dynamic entity. Understanding this small, specific case of a collection like Klasies can help us unpack the broader cases for epistemic life histories of other objects, like these collections (Deetz ; Feest ; Schickore ).…”
Section: The Klasies River Mouth Collectionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…In many ways, this “cultural cachet” that we see in relation to the Klasies collection could be described as the historical agreement that the collection has a shared point of identity and institutional or disciplinary memory (Ashmore and Kapp ; Feest ). The Klasies collection becomes the touchstone for interpretation and measurement.…”
Section: The Faunal Chaptermentioning
confidence: 99%
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