The Pathology of Privilege: The Economic Consequences of Government Favoritism

Entrepreneurship prompts institutional change in developing economies

“…Hence, these entrepreneurs cause institutional change through activities that are directly aimed at policymakers who have the power to alter institutions (Buchanan 1980;Lawrence and Suddaby 2006). While it is typically seen as problematic and detrimental to economic growth when large corporations attempt to shape government regulations in ways favorable to themselves (Hillman et al 2004;Lawton et al 2013;Mitchell 2014), Lambsdorff (2002) questions the validity of treating lobbying as equally wasteful as corruption. As we shall see, policy innovations originating with firms can improve welfare (Leyden and Link 2015), even in developing countries.…”

Platform Teknolojileri ve Temsiliyet Sorunu: Uber ve Booking.com Vakaları

“…Yine, devlet-uygulamalı tekeller ile ilişkisi (Evans and Schmalensee, 2016;Parker et al, 2016); aynı zamanda bu firmaların mesela bulundukları pazarlardan elde ettikleri komisyon açısından kar'a erişimleri ve kar etme koşulları (Richardson, 2015) incelenirken bu firmaların dağınık örgüt yapısı sebebiyle çalışanları ile ilişkisi (Yetim, 2016) de irdelenmektedir. Yenilikçi dijital uygulamalar geleneksel uygulamalar ile karşılaştırıldığında devlet-uygulamalı ayrıcalıkların (örneğin, taksi piyasası) fiyatları arttırdığı, kaliteyi düşürdüğü, ve yenilikçiliği caydırdığı da tartşılmaktadır (Mitchell, 2012;Cramer and Krueger, 2016). Yine, Motala (2016) yeniliğin regülasyonunda dört mantık öne sürmektedir: (1) Piyasa başarısızlıklarının yarattığı sosyal açıkların düzeltilmesi, (2) Sosyal maliyet ve verimsizliklerin en aza indirilmesi, (3) Teori ve uygulama ile bağlantı kurma (4) Menfaat sahipleri arasında kazanılmış çıkarların dengelenmesi.…”

Crony Capitalism: Rent Seeking, Institutions and Ideology

“…Thirdly, the term “crony capitalism” has also been used to describe an evolution or tendency in Western nations, especially the United States (Li ; Henderson ; Meltzer ; Mitchell ; Zingales ). Cronyism is seen as a public choice side‐effect of the increasing number of regulations.…”

“…Rent‐seeking arrangements take different forms and have different functions depending on contextual factors such as the presence or absence of reliable rule of law or of an efficient tax collecting apparatus. The most important insight seems to be that while crony capitalism in high‐income contries can indeed be considered a “pathology” (Mitchell ), in developing countries it may be considered a second‐best substitute for the rule of law and limited government. “Failed states” are doing even worse than the crony capitalist countries in South America, South East Asia and Eastern Europe, precisely because they have no mechanism for securing property rights and thus no means of attracting foreign investment.…”

“…The notion of “crony capitalism” has become increasingly salient in recent years, in policy analysis (Mazumdar ; Roberts ; Mitchell ; Henderson ), in scholarly studies (Wade ; Haber ; Kang ; Li ), in popular books on economics (Zingales ; Meltzer ), as well as in mass media and in public and political life (both Occupy Wall Street and the Tea Party have made “crony capitalism” their target). Yet the notion of “crony capitalism” seems paradoxically ambiguous.…”