The Partial Identity Account of Partial Similarity Revisited

Morganti, Matteo

doi:10.1007/s11406-010-9290-5

Cited by 7 publications

(4 citation statements)

References 20 publications

(21 reference statements)

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“…Since both differences and proximities can be inferred from the same measure, it might seem appropriate to use absolute difference as a joint measure for both. This proposal is in line with a common practice of not distinguishing between similarity and dissimilarity measures (see, for example, Bigelow, , p. 461; and Morganti, , pp. 544–545).…”

Section: Measures Of Similarity and Dissimilaritysupporting

confidence: 72%

Measures of Similarity

Enflo

2020

Theoria

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This article analyses the relationship between the concept of single aspect similarity and proposed measures of similarity. More precisely, it compares eleven measures of similarity in terms of how well they satisfy a list of desiderata, chosen to capture common intuitions concerning the properties of similarity and the relations between similarity and dissimilarity. Three types of measures are discussed: similarity as commonality, similarity as a function of dissimilarity, and similarity as a joint function of commonality and difference. Relative to the desiderata, it is found that a measure of the second type fares the best. However, rather than recommend this measure alone as a measure of similarity, it is suggested that there are at least three separate concepts of single aspect similarity, corresponding to the three types of measures. In light of this proposal, three of the eleven measures (and variants of these) are deemed acceptable.

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Section: Measures Of Similarity and Dissimilaritysupporting

confidence: 72%

Measures of Similarity

Enflo

2020

Theoria

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“…26 Here Morganti cites Zimmerman (1996). 27 Here Morganti cites Morganti (2011). 28 Infinitely descending grounding structures have been widely discussed, although they are not generally explicitly said to be infinitely ascending as well (i.e., such that every fact grounds some other fact).…”

Section: Non-foundationalist Grounding Structures Theoretical Unification Metaphysical Lawsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Metaphysical Foundationalism and Theoretical Unification

Brenner

2021

Erkenn

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Some facts ground other facts. Some fact is fundamental iff there are no other facts which partially or fully ground that fact. According to metaphysical foundationalism, every non-fundamental fact is fully grounded by some fundamental fact(s). In this paper I examine and defend some neglected considerations which might be made in favor of metaphysical foundationalism. Building off of work by Ross Cameron, I suggest that foundationalist theories are more unified than, and so in one important respect simpler than, non-foundationalist theories, insofar as foundationalist theories allow us to derive all non-fundamental facts from some fundamental fact(s). Non-foundationalist theories can enjoy a similar sort of theoretical unification only by taking on objectionable metaphysical laws.

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“…Indeed, in several cases metaphysical infinitism has been presented as the only approach able to provide 'non-ostrich' explanations of certain philosophical problems, i.e., explana-tions that do not simply rely on the assumption of something as a basic primitive and/or a non-further-explicable fact. Without entering into details, this has been argued to be the case, for instance, for the ontological constitution of facts and Bradley's regress (Orilia (2006(Orilia ( , 2009, for the notion of literal contact between extended objects (Zimmermann 1996) and for the analysis of partial similarity facts in terms of partial identity (Morganti 2011).…”

Section: The Regress Of Being Objectionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Dependence, Justification and Explanation: Must Reality be Well-Founded?

Morganti

2014

Erkenn

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This paper is about metaphysical 'infinitism', the view that there are, or could be, infinite chains of ontological dependence. Its main aim is to show that, contrary to widespread opinion, metaphysical infinitism is a coherent position. On the basis of this, it is then additionally argued that metaphysical infinitism need not fare worse than the more canonical 'foundationalist' alternatives when it comes to formulating metaphysical explanations. In the course of the discussion, a rather unexplored parallel with the debate concerning infinitism about justification is suggested.

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The Partial Identity Account of Partial Similarity Revisited

Cited by 7 publications

References 20 publications

Measures of Similarity

Measures of Similarity

Metaphysical Foundationalism and Theoretical Unification

Dependence, Justification and Explanation: Must Reality be Well-Founded?

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