Metaphysical Foundationalism and Theoretical Unification

Abstract

Some facts ground other facts. Some fact is fundamental iff there are no other facts which partially or fully ground that fact. According to metaphysical foundationalism, every non-fundamental fact is fully grounded by some fundamental fact(s). In this paper I examine and defend some neglected considerations which might be made in favor of metaphysical foundationalism. Building off of work by Ross Cameron, I suggest that foundationalist theories are more unified than, and so in one important respect simpler than, non-foundationalist theories, insofar as foundationalist theories allow us to derive all non-fundamental facts from some fundamental fact(s). Non-foundationalist theories can enjoy a similar sort of theoretical unification only by taking on objectionable metaphysical laws.

Why Do Things Exist and Why Is There Something Rather Than Nothing?

“…In this sense, the entity previously called "nothing" would be the physical embodiment of the empty set, which is that construct that mathematicians use to construct all natural numbers. Given this, the current solution is fundamentalist in nature, and indicates that our existence is "well-founded" because "every non-fundamental fact is fully grounded by some fundamental fact(s)" (Brenner, 2021), with the sole fundamental fact being the existent entity previously called "nothing".…”