The Paradox of State Power in Africa: Debt Management Policies in Kenya and Zimbabwe

Abstract

A central debate in the literature on the state has focused on the state's relative strength and weakness in relation to society (Skocpol 1979; Nordlinger 1981, 1987; Evans, et al., 1985; Carnoy 1984). While this debate initially examined developed states and, more recently, semi-industrialized states in Latin America, increasing attention has shifted to African states. It is here where a paradox has emerged that has generated further questions about state power and state-society relations. Africa is plagued with political instability, coup d'etats, deteriorating economic conditions, and ineffective policy implementation (Sandbrook 1985). The current difficulties in meeting scheduled debt repayment deadlines and the pressure to make significant economic adjustments further illustrate the precarious financial status of many African states. Yet, African societies are well known for their heavily centralized bureaucratic apparatus that consumes a substantial portion of expenditures and capital investments. One indicator of state influence is the steady growth of parastatals in African countries. As they have expanded in number and in function, state power over these firms also has grown. And, in response to rapidly deteriorating economic conditions, many African states have enacted widescale debt management controls on foreign investment, public borrowing, and public sector investment. Scholars, whether conceptualizing this influential social group as an “organizational bourgeoisie” or a “managerial bourgeoisie,” consider African state bureaucracies to have their own power capabilities and defined interests (Markowitz 1977; Sklar 1979).

Financial Access and Exclusion in Kenya and Uganda

“…According to Brownbridge (1998b), Kenyan post-independence policy towards the financial sector was extensive but not especially repressive as the banking system expanded both in terms of institutional diversity and the value of assets and liabilities in the system and government effort was mainly involved in setting up government owned banks, non-bank financial institutions (NBFIs) and development finance institutions and did not directly interfere in the operations of the international commercial banks. However, political interests have been key factors in the performance of both the national banks and NBFIs (Lehman 1992;Ogachi 1999). Deregulation of interest rates and charges that did exist took place in the early 1990s (Brownbridge 1998b) and since then the key factor influencing bank lending rates has been macroeconomic management.…”

Electoral Campaigns, Media, and the New World of Digital Politics

“…Consequently, this heightened ethnic tensions and sometimes led to violence. Much of the literature on Kenyan political and economic changes have attempted to explain the causes of ethnicity and ethnic conflicts that have punctuated the country's electoral history (Lehman 1992;Mueller 2008;Mutua 2009;Ogachi 1999). While ethnicity and ethnic conflicts have been a major trait of Kenyan history, it would suffice to argue that the neoliberal reforms intensified these conflicts.…”

Walk the line: Conflict, state capacity and the political dynamics of reform

“…Our extension adapts Glaeser 11 For example, President Museveni's attempt to reform the land tenure system in Uganda was crippled by ethnic conflict, because the adverse distributional consequences of this reform were concentrated on the Baganda (Green, 2006). Similarly, according to Lehman (1992), reform in Kenya could not be politically sustained due to the (ethnically) uneven incidence of benefits and costs from further reform.…”