The Paradox of Analysis: A Solution

Chisholm, RoderickM.; Potter, Richard C.

doi:10.1111/j.1467-9973.1981.tb00110.x

Cited by 8 publications

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“…I have chosen to use the expression 'is A ' to distinguish analyses from mere predications and identifications, but one could also use the standard schema with the biconditional expressed by 'iff A ' or 'iff def ' to serve the same purpose. 18 Chisholm and Potter (1981;1, 6) draw this distinction as well, though they do not use the term "the 'is' of analysis". They take a sentence like 'A cube is a CS w/ SAS', when taken as an analysis, to be short for 'being a cube is analyzed by being a CS w/ SAS'.…”

Section: Toward a New Solutionmentioning

confidence: 94%

“…At the very least, the truth conditions on the A-relation would have to include the general conditions on what counts as a genuine candidate classical analysis. Taking cues from Moore (1903Moore ( / 1994Moore ( , 1966Moore ( , 1968, Chisholm and Potter (1981), , Sosa (1983, Jackson (1998), Rieber (1994) and King (1998) A solution to the paradox now looks to be available. Following the general form above, what is expressed by (2) ('A cube is a CS w/ SAS'), construed as an analysis, is the proposition that: (1) ('A cube is a cube')?…”

Section: If Something's Being An Instance Of [G] Can Be Inferred Frommentioning

confidence: 96%

“…Similarly, I take analysanda and analysantia to be concepts, rather than the verbal expressions used to express them. 3 See also Sellars (1964), Chisholm and Potter (1981), and Bealer (1982) for other attempted solutions. 4 A complex concept is a concept with an analysis in terms of some other concepts.…”

Section: The Paradox Of Analysismentioning

confidence: 98%

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A Semantic Resolution of the Paradox of Analysis

Earl

2007

Acta Anal

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The paradox of analysis has been a problem for analytic philosophers at least since Moore's time, and it is especially significant for those who seek an account of analysis along classical lines. The present paper offers a new solution to the paradox, where a theory of analysis is given where (1) analysandum and analysans are distinct concepts, due to their failing to share the same conceptual form, yet (2) they are related in virtue of satisfying various semantic constraints on the analysis relation. Rather than distinguish between analysandum and analysans by appeal to epistemic considerations, the paper appeals to semantic considerations in giving a candidate account of the identity conditions for concepts. The distinctness of analysandum and analysans then serves to block the paradox in a straightforward way.The traditional Socratic search for definitions has always played a role in philosophy. While the search for necessary conditions, sufficient conditions, and necessary and jointly sufficient conditions has been emphasized and de-emphasized over the history of philosophy, that search has been most explicitly undertaken by those in the analytic tradition. For if one were to list the basic tenets of analytic philosophy, among them would most certainly be the thesis that there are conceptual analyses 1 to be discovered, and the basic practice of seeking such analyses is of course one of the

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Section: Toward a New Solutionmentioning

confidence: 94%

Section: If Something's Being An Instance Of [G] Can Be Inferred Frommentioning

confidence: 96%

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A Semantic Resolution of the Paradox of Analysis

Earl

2007

Acta Anal

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“…E.g. :Black (1944),White (1948), Linksy (1949),Chisholm & Potter (1981),Fumerton (1983),Ackerman (1990).…”

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confidence: 99%

Scepticism & transcendental arguments: Some methodological reconsiderations

Westphal

2017

Filoz drus

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Kant provided two parallel, sound proofs of mental content externalism; both prove this thesis: We human beings could not think of ourselves as persisting through apparent changes in what we (apparently) experience-nor could we think of the apparent spatio-temporal world of objects, events and people-unless in fact we are conscious of some aspects of the actual spatio-temporal world and have at least some rudimentary knowledge of it. Such proofs turn, not on general facts about (or features of) the world, but on appreciating various fundamental regards in which our finite human cognizance depends upon the world we inhabit. The 'transcendental' character of these analyses concerns identifying and appreciating various fundamental features of our finite form of human mindedness, and basic constraints upon, and prospects of, cognitive justification within the non-formal domain of human empirical knowledge. Such analyses and proofs have been developed in various ways, using distinctive strategies, not only by Kant, but also by Hegel, C.I. Lewis, Heidegger, Wittgenstein and Frederick Will. Here I examine and defend the methodological reflections required to understand, assess and appreciate such transcendental proofs, and why so few analytic epistemologists have found them persuasive or illuminating.

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Does the actual world actually exist?

McNamara

1993

Philos Stud

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The Paradox of Analysis: A Solution

Cited by 8 publications

References 0 publications

A Semantic Resolution of the Paradox of Analysis

A Semantic Resolution of the Paradox of Analysis

Scepticism & transcendental arguments: Some methodological reconsiderations

Does the actual world actually exist?

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