“…By contrast, the Equivalence Principle seems to postulate a substantive connection between genuine metaphysical possibilities and the existence of possible worlds, and what makes the connection between the two substantive is their conceptual independence. 5 Plantinga's attempted derivation rests on: (a) an unspecified theory of propositions that includes at least one strong existence principle (namely, that for any set S of propositions, there is a proposition, ∧S, that is the conjunction of the propositions in S); (b) no formal identity conditions for propositions, which in particular means there is no guarantee that there is a unique actual world (McNamara 1993); (c) a fragment of set theory that includes the axioms of Pairing, Union, and Choice (which entail an infinite ontology of sets); (d) the (highly problematic) thesis that for any proposition p, there is a set A p of propositions that are possible and entail p; and (e) an unjustified modal principle (namely, that the conjunction ∧B of any "maximal" chain B of propositions in A p is possible). For further details regarding (c)-(e) see Menzel 1989. 6 Christopher Menzel and Edward N. Zalta the existence of the actual world, one has to ensure the existence of some sort of construct -a large conjunction or set of propositions, for example -that implies all and only the true propositions.…”