The other side of the Article 21(3) coin: Human rights in the Rome Statute and the limits of Article 21(3)

Abstract

The drafters of the Rome Statute sought to accord human rights a central place within the legal framework of the International Criminal Court (ICC). This was done not only through numerous provisions on the rights of the accused, victims, and witnesses, but also through the inclusion of the overarching Article 21(3) of the Rome Statute. Article 21(3) Rome Statute requires that the interpretation and application of all ICC law be consistent with internationally recognized human rights. While this provision has been employed on numerous occasions to bolster human rights protection in the ICC legal framework, it is not without its limits. In a series of decisions over the past few years, ICC judges have placed limits on the protections that can be read into the ICC legal framework on the basis of Article 21(3). Beyond stating that the ICC ‘is not a human rights court’, the decisions in question articulate no clear justification for the limitations imposed on Article 21(3). The present article analyses these decisions and identifies the underlying rationale for the Court’s approach: the principle of speciality. However, the picture is further complicated by the judges’ willingness to overlook the principle of speciality when particularly serious violations of human rights are involved. This leaves the precise contours of human rights protection in the ICC legal framework undefined.

Ecocide Before the International Criminal Court: Simplicity is Better Than an Elaborate Embellishment

“…This provision has the potential to broaden the ICC's powers significantly as it applies to all sources of law in Article 21 of the Statute. 305 The effect of that provision has been the subject of vigorous discussion, with some narrowing it to a Ômandatory principle of consistency' 306 and others contemplating that it establishes an additional source of law for the Court 307 or even creates Ôa sort of international super-legality'. 308 All in all, Article 21(3) of the Statute establishes a positive roadmap that guides the interpretation and application of other statutory provisions.…”

A aplicação judicial do direito: a metodologia jurídica aplicada pelos juízes do Tribunal Penal Internacional

“…os Elementos dos Crimes e as Regras Processuais se encontram numa posição de primazia sobre as restantes fontes e, por outro lado, a aceitação de princípios estruturantes do direito, desde que não sejam incompatíveis com o tratado nem com as normas de direito internacional. Relativamente à hierarquia de fontes, o Estatuto, enquanto corpo legal de regras será aplicado em primeiro lugar, as regras de procedimento estão-lhe subordinadas e os elementos constitutivos dos crimes servem de auxílio à interpretação (artigo 9º), naquilo que a doutrina designa de um "princípio de consistência obrigatório" (GALLANT, 2013;IRVING, 2019;VASILIEV, 2009;ZEEGERS, 2016 No que respeita ao primeiro ponto da discussão, a questão em causa resulta da necessidade de se estabelecer em que medida um tribunal penal internacional, criado por tratado, pode ou deve inspirar-se em conceitos de direito interno e transpô-los para o processo penal internacional quando existem preceitos específicos no ER que estabelecem diretrizes interpretativas. Os conceitos de direito penal no direito interno dos Estados resultam de um ius puniendi enquanto expressão da soberania dos Estados e cada sistema jurídico tem diferentes perspetivas quanto aos seus fundamentos e o modo como são interpretados ou aplicados.…”