The Other Side of the COIN: Minimum and Exemplary Force in British Army Counterinsurgency in Kenya

Abstract

This article argues that the British government's deliberate exclusion of international law from colonial counterinsurgencies allowed the army to suppress opponents with little restraint. The oft-assumed national inhibitor, the principle of 'minimum force', was actually widely permissive. As a result exemplary force was employed to coerce the Kikuyu civilian population in Kenya into supporting the government rather than the insurgents. Apparently random acts were thus strategic, and emerged in three forms: beatings and torture, murders, and forced population movement. The article argues that such harsh measures were seen as necessary and effective; they were a form of indirect policy and did not arise from a disciplinary breakdown.

Reversal of Fortune? Strategy Change and Counterinsurgency Success by Foreign Powers in the Twentieth Century

“…For example, during the Mau–Mau Rebellion (that is, the Kenyan Emergency, 1952–1960), the British initially employed widespread repression against civilians. However, when Gen. George Erskine took over command of the British COIN, he designated special reserves to protect the villagers as well as favoring a more selective use of military force (Bennett ). Herein, the British COIN after the arrival of Erskine was coded as consistent with HaM because the British sought to protect the local population, as well as exercise restraint in the application of military force.…”

“…We rely on the following sources to assist in our coding of the sample of cases: Aldrich (), Alexander and Keiger (), Allen and Rigsbee (), Andrews (), Ashworth (), Asprey (), Beede (), Benda (), Bennett (), Bickel (), Borodziej (), Bowden (), Bowen and Alvarez (), Budiardjo, Liong and Liem (), Burds (), Burgwyn (), Byler (), Cale (), Castle (), Chandler (), Artemov (), Corum (), Davidson (), Demetz (), Dhada (), Eidintas, Zalys and Tuskenis (), Ellison and Smyth (), Fieldhouse (), Gall and Waal (), Gann and Duignan (), George (), Ghosh (), Gleijeses (), Gottesman (), Grau and Gress (), Greenberg (), Hahn (), Halecki (), Hamilton‐Merritt (), Hanson (), Hughes (), Hull (), Iliffe (), Iron (), Jacobsen (), Jensen (), Jian (), Jones (), Judge (), Kautt (), Kennedy‐Pipe and McInnes (), Lackman (), Lumans (), Madley (), Marshall (), Walker (), Mawby (), May (), McCarl (), Melshen (), Merrill and Metz (), Miller (), Modarelli (), Olcott (), Oliker (), Opello Jr. (), Osuntokun (), Paoletti (), Pathak (2005), Penders (…”

Counterinsurgency Doctrine Applied to Infectious Disease

“…Broad spectrum antibiotics target both the insurgents and the healthy microbiome for indiscriminate destruction. This is not in keeping with FM 3-24, which espouses restraint (even in the context of military casualties) and minimizes collateral damage (explored and debated in Newsinger 1992, Thronton 2004, Bennett 2007, Criddle 2011, Reis 2011 (Hamad 2010) for each new antibiotic to address as many cases as conceivable. Naturally, a single antibiotic that could treat every infection would be attractive to the market.…”

Light and dark: the contrasting approaches of British counter terrorism

“…Essentially, each of the above three innovations was an attempt either to minimise the deaths of soldiers, or to minimise any potential political backlash (Dixon, 2009). As such, the 'hearts-andminds' approach presented a politically acceptable façade, behind which the army was able to use highly coercive measures such as forced resettlement, arson against the homes of insurgents, wholesale detention of large parts of the population without trial, and arbitrary arrest and deportation of foreigners (Bennett, 2007;Hack, 1995).…”