Reversal of Fortune? Strategy Change and Counterinsurgency Success by Foreign Powers in the Twentieth Century

Abstract

Will a strategy change toward one of “hearts and minds” alter the eventual outcome of the American‐led allied war effort in Afghanistan? We investigate this question by analyzing 66 cases of counterinsurgency warfare from the twentieth century in which a foreign power seeks to defend a central authority in a state or colonial territory against an insurgency. We identify whether and when a foreign power implemented a change in its counterinsurgency strategy, whether said change involved a shift toward a strategy reflecting a hearts and minds emphasis, as well as the foreign power's eventual success or failure in prevailing over insurgents. We find that while shifting toward a strategy of hearts and minds increases the chances for success, the improvement is modest and requires nearly a decade to produce. Furthermore, we find that the impact of a strategy change is conditional on the timing of the change, with a “window of opportunity” associated with success closing after approximately eight years of war. Our findings bode poorly for allied efforts in contemporary Afghanistan.

What Do We Know about Civil War Outcomes?

“…They do note, however, that the mean duration of conflicts that shifted toward hearts and minds (8.58 years) was over 3 years longer than that of conflicts in which strategies changed away from hearts and minds (5.25 years) (Enterline et al. :191). Moreover, the most successful COIN operations changed strategies earlier in the conflict leading Enterline et al.…”

“…The second study by Enterline, Stull, and Magagnoli (), examines the effect of changes in COIN strategy on the success of foreign interventions to support incumbent governments in 66 civil war cases. The authors explicitly focus on the effects of enemy‐centric versus population‐centric COIN strategies on macro‐level conflict outcomes.…”

“…They observe a 66% success rate in post‐1946 conflicts where strategy shifted toward hearts and minds, while only a 37% success rate in those conflicts where strategy shifted away from hearts and minds (Enterline et al. :190). They do note, however, that the mean duration of conflicts that shifted toward hearts and minds (8.58 years) was over 3 years longer than that of conflicts in which strategies changed away from hearts and minds (5.25 years) (Enterline et al.…”

Successful and Less Successful Interventions: Stabilizing Iraq and Afghanistan

“…Enterline and Greig () forecasted a low probability for the troop surge to tame the insurgency there, but they did not broach the question of SOI's effect. Enterline, Stull, and Magagnoli () suggest that counterinsurgency forces' shift in strategy toward “hearts and minds” campaigns can make all the difference, if enacted within the first 8 years of a campaign (2013). Our study's results suggest, however, that the SOI program, and not the surge, was the policy intervention responsible for successfully decreasing casualty rates for both Iraqi civilians and Coalition troops.…”

“…Although Enterline et al. () suggest that this is because the war in Afghanistan has simply dragged on too long (given a roughly eight‐year “window of opportunity” to adjust counterinsurgency strategy in ways similar to the Iraqi adjustment), we offer other factors to consider. Counterinsurgency strategies—including a troop surge and the cultivating of more local allied militias—appear much more difficult to successfully implement in Afghanistan than in Iraq.…”