Abstract:Social evaluation is a mental process that leverages the preference toward prosocial partners (positivity bias) against the avoidance of antisocial individuals (negativity bias) in a cooperative context. The phenomenon is well-known in humans, and recently comparative investigations looked at the possible evolutionary origins. So far social evaluation has been investigated mainly in non-human and human primates and dogs, however, there are few data on the presence of negativity/positivity bias in client-cleane… Show more
“…Furthermore, studies have reported that people's moral identity is threatened when moral standards conflict with self-interest (Valdesolo and Desteno, 2007;Monin et al, 2009;O'Connor et al, 2020). To reduce cognitive conflict, people often adopt different approaches: when encountering moral standards, people usually avoid MH behaviors; when these behaviors are not avoided, they lower their moral standards to rationalize their hypocritical behavior (López-Pérez and Spiegelman, 2013;Kish-Gephart et al, 2014;Abdai and Miklósi, 2016). For this study, the moral behavior of strangers was undoubtedly the established moral standard.…”
Section: Effects Of the Behavior Of In-group Or Out-group Strangers Omentioning
Moral hypocrisy (MH) occurs when people fail to practice what they preach. Despite the prevalence of the effect of social identity on an individual's MH, few empirical studies have explored contextual factors that may help reduce MH. By conducting two experiments based on the research paradigm of real stranger presence, we examined how in-group and out-group strangers' presence and moral behavior may contribute to reducing MH. The results of experiment 1 demonstrated that compared with the presence of out-group strangers, the presence of in-group strangers could effectively inhibit MH (no significant difference between participants reported and actual donation proportions was obtained). The results of experiment 2 replicated and extended the results of experiment 1, first by showing that the presence of in-group strangers could effectively inhibit MH and then by revealing the influence of present strangers' behavior (moral or hypocritical) on MH. The results indicated that strangers' moral behavior could effectively eliminate participants' MH, especially in the presence of in-group strangers. However, when present strangers exhibited hypocritical behavior, they exhibited no effect on participants' MH, irrespective of the condition of in-group and out-group strangers. The current study provides empirical support for theories related to MH and moral decision-making and contributes to the literature on in-group and out-group effects on MH and decision-making.
“…Furthermore, studies have reported that people's moral identity is threatened when moral standards conflict with self-interest (Valdesolo and Desteno, 2007;Monin et al, 2009;O'Connor et al, 2020). To reduce cognitive conflict, people often adopt different approaches: when encountering moral standards, people usually avoid MH behaviors; when these behaviors are not avoided, they lower their moral standards to rationalize their hypocritical behavior (López-Pérez and Spiegelman, 2013;Kish-Gephart et al, 2014;Abdai and Miklósi, 2016). For this study, the moral behavior of strangers was undoubtedly the established moral standard.…”
Section: Effects Of the Behavior Of In-group Or Out-group Strangers Omentioning
Moral hypocrisy (MH) occurs when people fail to practice what they preach. Despite the prevalence of the effect of social identity on an individual's MH, few empirical studies have explored contextual factors that may help reduce MH. By conducting two experiments based on the research paradigm of real stranger presence, we examined how in-group and out-group strangers' presence and moral behavior may contribute to reducing MH. The results of experiment 1 demonstrated that compared with the presence of out-group strangers, the presence of in-group strangers could effectively inhibit MH (no significant difference between participants reported and actual donation proportions was obtained). The results of experiment 2 replicated and extended the results of experiment 1, first by showing that the presence of in-group strangers could effectively inhibit MH and then by revealing the influence of present strangers' behavior (moral or hypocritical) on MH. The results indicated that strangers' moral behavior could effectively eliminate participants' MH, especially in the presence of in-group strangers. However, when present strangers exhibited hypocritical behavior, they exhibited no effect on participants' MH, irrespective of the condition of in-group and out-group strangers. The current study provides empirical support for theories related to MH and moral decision-making and contributes to the literature on in-group and out-group effects on MH and decision-making.
“…This finding is consistent with previous studies that show proselfs tended to be fairer and more generous when their behaviors would be perceived by others ( Van Dijk et al, 2004 ). Proselfs mightuse apparent fairness as a strategy to avoid being perceived as unfair partners by others, since people usually use social evaluation to recognize prosocial and antisocial partners ( Abdai, 2016 ), or to avoid punishment andexclusion in the future ( Henrich et al, 2010 ; Gausel and Leach, 2011 ).…”
Deception varies across individuals and social contexts. The present research explored how individual difference measured by social value orientations, and situations, affect deception in moral hypocrisy. In two experiments, participants made allocations between themselves and recipients with an opportunity to deceive recipients where recipients cannot reject their allocations. Experiment 1 demonstrated that proselfs were more deceptive and hypocritical than prosocials by lying to be apparently fair, especially when deception was unrevealed. Experiment 2 showed that proselfs were more concerned about social image in deception in moral hypocrisy than prosocials were. They decreased apparent fairness when deception was revealed and evaluated by a third-party reviewer and increased it when deception was evaluated but unrevealed. These results show that prosocials and proselfs differed in pursuing deception and moral hypocrisy social goals and provide implications for decreasing deception and moral hypocrisy.
“…For instance, babies already have a preference for agents who help, rather than hinder others (Hamlin et al, 2007). Such studies are also increasingly done with non-human animals, as reviewed in Abdai and Miklósi (2016). For instance, in a study modeled after Hamlin et al (2007), bonobos unexpectedly showed a preference for hinderers, rather than helpers (Krupenye and Hare, 2018).…”
Section: Prosocial Concernmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…For instance, in a study modeled after Hamlin et al (2007), bonobos unexpectedly showed a preference for hinderers, rather than helpers (Krupenye and Hare, 2018). Abdai and Miklósi (2016) point out that there are still considerable conceptual and procedural issues in animal social evaluation studies, in particular to clearly demonstrate positivity biases. Negativity biases may be taxonomically far more widespread than positivity biases, since the need to avoid harm is universal whereas the need to cooperate is less common.…”
Section: Prosocial Concernmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Negativity biases may be taxonomically far more widespread than positivity biases, since the need to avoid harm is universal whereas the need to cooperate is less common. Evidence for positivity biases (which correspond to the third-party perspective on prosociality) appears present too in several non-human primate species but is more elusive due to methodological issues, including the use of humans rather than conspecifics as target individuals (see Abdai and Miklósi, 2016). …”
The aim of this contribution is to explore the origins of moral behavior and its underlying moral preferences and intuitions from an evolutionary perspective. Such a perspective encompasses both the ultimate, adaptive function of morality in our own species, as well as the phylogenetic distribution of morality and its key elements across primates. First, with regard to the ultimate function, we argue that human moral preferences are best construed as adaptations to the affordances of the fundamentally interdependent hunter-gatherer lifestyle of our hominin ancestors. Second, with regard to the phylogenetic origin, we show that even though full-blown human morality is unique to humans, several of its key elements are not. Furthermore, a review of evidence from non-human primates regarding prosocial concern, conformity, and the potential presence of universal, biologically anchored and arbitrary cultural norms shows that these elements of morality are not distributed evenly across primate species. This suggests that they have evolved along separate evolutionary trajectories. In particular, the element of prosocial concern most likely evolved in the context of shared infant care, which can be found in humans and some New World monkeys. Strikingly, many if not all of the elements of morality found in non-human primates are only evident in individualistic or dyadic contexts, but not as third-party reactions by truly uninvolved bystanders. We discuss several potential explanations for the unique presence of a systematic third-party perspective in humans, but focus particularly on mentalizing ability and language. Whereas both play an important role in present day, full-blown human morality, it appears unlikely that they played a causal role for the original emergence of morality. Rather, we suggest that the most plausible scenario to date is that human morality emerged because our hominin ancestors, equipped on the one hand with large and powerful brains inherited from their ape-like ancestor, and on the other hand with strong prosocial concern as a result of cooperative breeding, could evolve into an ever more interdependent social niche.
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