The Ontological Turn

Martin, C. B.; Heil, John

doi:10.1111/1475-4975.00003

Cited by 158 publications

(29 citation statements)

References 15 publications

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“…Furthermore, Mondadori and Morton give physical laws a central causal role; we take dispositions to be more basic than laws. Martin and Heil (1999) also endorse a dispositional account of possibility. Though they do not develop the account, they suggest that the right kind of dispositional realism would replace the need for modal realism.…”

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confidence: 95%

A Dispositional Theory of Possibility

2007

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The paper defends a naturalistic version of modal actualism according to which what is metaphysically possible is determined by dispositions found in the actual world. We argue that there is just one world – this one – and that all genuine possibilities are grounded in the dispositions exemplified in it. This is the case whether or not those dispositions are manifested. As long as the possibility is one that would obtain were the relevant disposition manifested, it is a genuine possibility. Furthermore, by starting from actual dispositional properties and branching out, we are able to countenance possibilities quite far removed from any state of affairs that happens to obtain, while still providing a natural and actual grounding of possibility. Stressing the importance of ontological considerations in any theory of possibility, it is argued that the account of possibility in terms of dispositional properties provides a more palatable ontology than those of its competitors. Coming at it from the other direction, the dispositional account of possibility also provides motivation for taking an ontology of dispositions more seriously.

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confidence: 95%

A Dispositional Theory of Possibility

2007

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“…I will simply refer to this more generic generative relation as 20 That causation is diachronic, while a widespread assumption, is not uncontroversial. For dissenting views, see Huemer and Kovitz 2003, Ingthorsson 2002, and Martin 2007 I am here indebted to Kim 2005, pp. 36-38.…”

Section: Determination Versus Causation: Dispensing With Competition?mentioning

confidence: 99%

Intralevel Mental Causation

Buckareff¹

2011

Frontiers of Philosophy in China

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This paper identifies and critiques a theory of mental causation defended by some proponents of nonredutive physicalism that I call "intralevelism." Intralevelist theories differ in their details. On all versions, the causal outcome of the manifestation of physical properties is physical and the causal outcome of the manifestation of mental properties is mental. Thus, mental causation on this view is intralevel mental to mental causation. This characterization of mental causation as intralevel is taken to insulate nonreductive physicalism from some objections to nonreductive physicalism, including versions of the exclusion argument. This paper examines some features of three recent versions of intralevelism defended by John Gibbons, Markus Schlosser, and Amie Thomasson. This paper shows that the distinctive problems faced by these three representative versions of intralevelism suggest that the intralevelist strategy does not provide a viable solution to the exclusion problem.

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“…More likely, every property is at once dispositional and qualitative (Martin 1997;Martin and Heil 1999;Heil 2003). Certainly this appears to be the case for properties of ordinary material bodies.…”

Section: Nine Thesesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…A single property, being fragile, is multiply realizable: the property is possessed by objects by virtue of those objects' possession of some distinct, lower-level realizing property (see Figure 2). I believe such reasoning is founded on a confusion (Heil 1999). We find it convenient to say that a teacup, a piece of slate, a pocket watch, and a gramophone record all possess the same disposition: being fragile.…”

Section: Nine Thesesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Dispositions

Heil

2005

Synthese

Self Cite

105

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Appeals to dispositionality in explanations of phenomena in metaphysics and the philosophy of mind, require that we first agree on what we are talking about. I sketch an account of what dispositionality might be. That account will place me at odds with most current conceptions of dispositionality. My aim is not to establish a weighty ontological thesis, however, but to move the discussion ahead in two respects. First, I want to call attention to the extent to which assumptions philosophers have made about dispositionality are far from innocent. The assumptions incorporate substantive theses that, by constraining the space of 'acceptable' answers to particular philosophical questions, have inhibited the search for answers to those questions. Second, and more positively, I hope to open up the space of possibilities by offering an alternative way of conceiving dispositionality developed by C. B. Martin.

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The Ontological Turn

Cited by 158 publications

References 15 publications

A Dispositional Theory of Possibility

A Dispositional Theory of Possibility

Intralevel Mental Causation

Dispositions

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