Dispositions

Abstract

Appeals to dispositionality in explanations of phenomena in metaphysics and the philosophy of mind, require that we first agree on what we are talking about. I sketch an account of what dispositionality might be. That account will place me at odds with most current conceptions of dispositionality. My aim is not to establish a weighty ontological thesis, however, but to move the discussion ahead in two respects. First, I want to call attention to the extent to which assumptions philosophers have made about dispositionality are far from innocent. The assumptions incorporate substantive theses that, by constraining the space of 'acceptable' answers to particular philosophical questions, have inhibited the search for answers to those questions. Second, and more positively, I hope to open up the space of possibilities by offering an alternative way of conceiving dispositionality developed by C. B. Martin.

Partial Resemblance and Property Immanence

“…Second, knowing something through relations is one thing; it's standing in similarity relations that aren't founded on intrinsic features is another. Third, it seems most plausible to say that we know electrons and muons through their powers , and there is a good case to be made that powers are intrinsic (Heil and ).…”

A powers theory of modality: or, how I learned to stop worrying and reject possible worlds

“…Uninstantiated universals do not exist, but surely there could have been different properties that behaved slightly or even radically different than the properties actually instantiated in this world. Surely there are possibilities that 20 Versions of this view of properties are defended by, among others, Shoemaker (1980Shoemaker ( , 1998, Martin (2008), Ellis and Lierse (1994), Ellis (2001), Molnar (2003), Mumford (2004Mumford ( , 2007, Heil (2004Heil ( , 2005, and Bird (2007). 21 While Fitch (1996) defends a view he calls Aristotelian actualism, his view invokes possible worlds and hence does not count as Aristotelian in my sense.…”

Free Will Theodicies for Theological Determinists

“…I do not intend here to adopt any particular theory of the nature of collective action and responsibility, but simply to refer to the phenomena; however, they are best understood. 25 See, e.g., (Heil 2005) and (Bird 2007). achieving freedom goods of collective exercises of significant control without committing some moral evils. 26 It is moreover proposed that these facts that are constituted by or are derivable from facts about human nature have the two features of Plantinga's counterfactuals.…”