2015
DOI: 10.1007/s11098-015-0468-3
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The ontological parsimony of mereology

Abstract: David Lewis (1991, 84) famously argued that mereology is ontologically innocent. Many who have considered this claim believe he was mistaken. Mereology is not innocent, because its acceptance entails the acceptance of sums, new objects that were not previously part of one's ontology. This argument, the argument from ontological parsimony, has two versions: a qualitative and a quantitative one. I argue that the defender of mereology can neutralize both arguments by holding that, given mereology, a commitment t… Show more

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Cited by 4 publications
(5 citation statements)
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“…Elsewhere, I (Smid, ) argued along similar lines that, from a mereological perspective, commitment to an object entails commitment to its parts because EP (a version of [No Other]) tells us that the whole would not be that particular whole were it not for the parts it has. Treating the parts as extra ontological commitments is arguably superfluous once the whole is mentioned: The commitment to that particular whole entails commitment to its parts.…”
Section: Mereology and “Nothing Over And Above”mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Elsewhere, I (Smid, ) argued along similar lines that, from a mereological perspective, commitment to an object entails commitment to its parts because EP (a version of [No Other]) tells us that the whole would not be that particular whole were it not for the parts it has. Treating the parts as extra ontological commitments is arguably superfluous once the whole is mentioned: The commitment to that particular whole entails commitment to its parts.…”
Section: Mereology and “Nothing Over And Above”mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…(Varzi 2000, 285) The Minimalist View tells us that one can either list Tibbles the cat or all the parts of Tibbles (and either list would be a correct one) but one should not put both the cat and its parts on the list. 28 27 For discussion, see Hawley (2014), Varzi (2000Smid (2015). 28 Franz Brentano may have had something similar in mind: '[I]t would be wrong to suppose that the two parts of a thing taken together constitute an additional third thing.…”
Section: Why a Mereologist May Want To Define '='mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The argument for nihilism from the theoretical unification conferred by nihilism does not cite the relative ontological parsimony of nihilism as a reason to think that nihilism is true. What's more, while several objections have been raised against arguments for nihilism from nihilism's ontological parsimony (see, e.g., Schaffer , ; Smid ), such objections do nothing to undermine the argument for nihilism from the theoretical unification conferred by nihilism.…”
Section: Nihilism and Theoretical Unification (I)mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…So, tables, chairs, dogs, tennis balls, and so on, don't exist, under the assumption that these things are composite objects if they exist. Recent debates over mereological nihilism have largely turned on the alleged relative theoretical simplicity of nihilism versus its rivals (see, e.g., Dorr ; Schaffer ; Horgan and Potrč 2008: Ch.7; Bennett ; Cowling , ; Kriegel ; Sider ; Woodard ; Hawley ; Tallant ; Korman ; Smid ). Nihilism's relative theoretical simplicity is important because it gives us some reason to think that nihilism is true .…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%