Mereological Nihilism and Theoretical Unification

Mereological Nihilism and Personal Ontology

“…In any case, if you believe in composition, and you (like almost every other person who believes in composition) think that the properties of some wholes are correlated with the properties of their proper parts, then you'll need to posit fundamental laws governing the relationship between wholes and their parts. Insofar as the believer in composition needs to posit such laws, while the nihilist does not, 7 Whether we call them "laws" or "principles" seems to me to be a superficial matter regarding how we use our words, and I only note the distinction here because some readers of this paper have been uncomfortable calling the principles in question "laws." The important point to note is that the mereological laws or principles are objectionable (if they are objectionable) for precisely the reason psycho-physical laws would be objectionable, namely insofar as they increase the complexity of our total theory.…”

Science and the special composition question

“…But note that I do not advocate any sort of across-the-board scientific anti-realism. 5 Rather, the anti-realism I advocate here is restricted to those components of scientific theories which refer to composite objects and composition relations. Feel free to believe the components of those theories which do not make reference to composition, as long as you merely accept the components of those theories which do make reference to composition.…”

Why Composition Matters

“…supports the view that disputes over Comp themselves have wide-ranging implications. At the very least, given the sheer number and variety of connections we've identified between Comp and other substantive disputes, it seems to us very doubtful 43 In this connection, see Brenner (2015a, 2015b, Korman (2016) and Rettler (2018). 44 Van Inwagen (1990, chapd.…”