The octopus and the unity of consciousness

Carls-Diamante, Sidney

doi:10.1007/s10539-017-9604-0

Cited by 20 publications

(15 citation statements)

References 28 publications

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“…Additionally, octopus arms are highly sensitive: each one is equipped with millions of sensory receptors that register tactile, chemical, and kinetic stimuli, which are extensively processed in the arm nervous system. Such an organisation suggests that if octopuses are conscious, the substrates of octopus consciousness may be distributed across the nervous system (Carls‐Diamante, ). Nevertheless, investigating the structure of consciousness in octopuses inevitably requires putting the empirical cart before the conceptual horse: doing so presupposes that there are reliable indicators of the presence of consciousness in octopuses.…”

Section: Difficult Casesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…To begin with, behaviours that are regarded as suggestive of consciousness in vertebrates (e.g., guiding a limb as it moves along an unusual trajectory) may not be so in octopuses. Due to the organisation of the octopus nervous system and its possible influence on the structure of consciousness that may arise from it (Carls‐Diamante, ), octopus consciousness (if present) may not contribute to behaviour in the ways it is presumed to in its vertebrate counterparts. For instance, because octopus arms are extremely flexible and have hydrostatic muscles, that is, muscles groups in which the shortening or lengthening of one group results in dynamical compensatory adjustments in the others (Levy, Nesher, Zullo, & Hochner, ), the motor trajectory of an arm can be updated by the physical activity of the muscles themselves (Richter, Hochner, & Kuba, ).…”

Section: Difficult Casesmentioning

confidence: 99%

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How to operationalise consciousness

Carruthers

Carls-Diamante²,

Huang³

et al. 2019

Australian Journal of Psychology

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Objective: To review the way consciousness is operationalised in contemporary research, discuss strengths and weaknesses of current approaches and propose new measures. Method: We first reviewed the literature pertaining to the phenomenal character of visual and self-consciousness as well as awareness of visual stimuli. We also reviewed more problematic cases of dreams and animal consciousness, specifically that of octopuses. Results: Despite controversies, work in visual and self-consciousness is highly developed and there are notable successes. Cases where experiences are not induced, such as dreams, and where no verbal report is possible, such as when we study purported experiences of octopuses, are more challenging. It is difficult to be confident about the reliability and validity of operationalisations of dreams.Although this is a general concern about the measuring consciousness, it is not a sufficiently severe concern to completely undermine the work reviewed on vision and self-consciousness. It is more difficult to see how the good work on human psychology can be applied to non-human animals, especially those with radically different nervous systems, such as octopuses. Given the limitations of report-based operationalisations of consciousness, it is desirable to develop non-report-based measures, particularly for phenomenal qualities. We examine a number of possibilities and offer two possible approaches of varying degrees of practicality, the first based on combining quality space descriptions of phenomenal qualities and the notion of a "neural activation space" inherited from connectionist A.I., the second being a novel match to target approach. Conclusion: Consciousness is a multi-faceted phenomenon and requires a variety of operationalisations to be studied.

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Section: Difficult Casesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Difficult Casesmentioning

confidence: 99%

How to operationalise consciousness

Carruthers

Carls-Diamante²,

Huang³

et al. 2019

Australian Journal of Psychology

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“…La razón de incluir a estos animales invertebrados en el ámbito de aplicación de la Directiva fue, según el considerando nº 8 de la misma, la existencia de pruebas científicas que acreditan la capacidad de estos animales de "experimentar dolor, sufrimiento, angustia y daño duradero" 10 .…”

Section: Protección De Los Cefalópodos En La Experimentaciónunclassified

Directive 2010/63/EU and cephalopods. A note on the Royal Decree 1386/2018

Giménez-Candela¹,

López²

2019

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La Directiva 2010/63/UE fue el primer texto legal en el que la Unión Europea reconoció expresamente la sentiencia de los cefalópodos, una clase de animales invertebrados a los que, por primera vez, otorgó protección, aunque únicamente con referencia al ámbito de la experimentación. El presente comentario analiza la importancia de esta Directiva para estos animales (básicamente pulpos, calamares, sepias y nautilos) así como el contraste que supone la ausencia de protección en materia de producción para el consumo humano. Dicho estudio tiene como punto de partida el RD 1386/2018, que complementa y corrige el RD 53/2013, texto legal que transpuso la Directiva en España. Asimismo, se hace mención al bienestar de los peces de cultivo y a la sentiencia de los crustáceos y sus implicaciones en el campo de la experimentación y de consumo humano.

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“…Biomineralisation is also an active topic for which a variety of taxa are used, from marine species such as abalone [24] and oyster [25] to freshwater Lymnaea stagnalis pond snails [26] or Cepaea land snails [27]. Indeed, many mollusc species have been put forward as 'models' in the niche sense of the concept, to answer a limited range of biological questions [28][29][30][31][32][33][34][35][36], although these model prospects frequently lack infrastructure and appropriate resources to enable in-depth investigations [4][5][6].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Mobilising molluscan models and genomes in biology

Davison¹,

Neiman²

2020

Preprint

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Molluscs are amongst the most ancient, diverse, and important of all animal taxa. Even so, no individual mollusc species has emerged as a broadly applied model system in biology. We here make the case that both perceptual and methodological barriers have played a role in the relative neglect of molluscs as research organisms. We then summarize the current application and potential of molluscs and their genomes to address important questions in animal biology, and the state of the field when it comes to the availability of resources such as genome assemblies, cell lines, and other key elements necessary to mobilising the development of molluscan model systems. We conclude by contending that a cohesive research community that works together to elevate multiple molluscan systems to ‘model’ status will create new opportunities in addressing basic and applied biological problems, including general features of animal evolution.

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The octopus and the unity of consciousness

Cited by 20 publications

References 28 publications

How to operationalise consciousness

How to operationalise consciousness

Directive 2010/63/EU and cephalopods. A note on the Royal Decree 1386/2018

Mobilising molluscan models and genomes in biology

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