How to operationalise consciousness

Abstract

Objective: To review the way consciousness is operationalised in contemporary research, discuss strengths and weaknesses of current approaches and propose new measures. Method: We first reviewed the literature pertaining to the phenomenal character of visual and self-consciousness as well as awareness of visual stimuli. We also reviewed more problematic cases of dreams and animal consciousness, specifically that of octopuses. Results: Despite controversies, work in visual and self-consciousness is highly developed and there are notable successes. Cases where experiences are not induced, such as dreams, and where no verbal report is possible, such as when we study purported experiences of octopuses, are more challenging. It is difficult to be confident about the reliability and validity of operationalisations of dreams.Although this is a general concern about the measuring consciousness, it is not a sufficiently severe concern to completely undermine the work reviewed on vision and self-consciousness. It is more difficult to see how the good work on human psychology can be applied to non-human animals, especially those with radically different nervous systems, such as octopuses. Given the limitations of report-based operationalisations of consciousness, it is desirable to develop non-report-based measures, particularly for phenomenal qualities. We examine a number of possibilities and offer two possible approaches of varying degrees of practicality, the first based on combining quality space descriptions of phenomenal qualities and the notion of a "neural activation space" inherited from connectionist A.I., the second being a novel match to target approach. Conclusion: Consciousness is a multi-faceted phenomenon and requires a variety of operationalisations to be studied.

Memory and Consciousness—Usually in Tandem but Sometimes Apart

“…It is well accepted that consciousness is difficult to measure ( Armstrong, 1898 ; Birch 2022 ; Carruthers et al, 2020 ; Mellor, 2019 ; Sandberg et al, 2010 ). Moreover, it is well established that consciousness is not simply present or absent but varies along a continuum.…”

Rethinking the definition of episodic memory.

“…Moreover, current evidence of episodic-like memory has been used as supportive evidence for the notion of animal consciousness (Griffin & Speck, 2004), further complicating the usefulness of the current definitions of episodic and episodic-like memory. Recent behavioural work with nonhumans, as well as plants, has further demonstrated that evaluating the presence of consciousness is a complicated topic (Carruthers, Carls-Diamante, Huang, Rosen, & Schier, 2019; Pagán, 2019; Segundo-Ortin & Calvo, 2019; Taiz et al, 2019). Indeed, without turning to self-report, it is difficult to measure consciousness in humans, as the definition of consciousness itself is nebulous at best.…”

The exclusionary approach to consciousness

“…The contrastive analysis established by Baars (1986) is the standard approach for trying to pinpoint the neural events and processes underlying such feelings and experiences. Despite the intimate relationship we all have with our own consciousness, it has proven to be a notoriously difficult task to operationalize it into measurable terms ( Irvine 2012 ; Phillips 2018b ; Carruthers et al. 2019 ; Bayne and Shea 2020 ; Michel 2020 , 2021 ).…”