The Normalization of Corrupt Business Practices: Implications for Integrative Social Contracts Theory (ISCT)

Spicer, Andrew

doi:10.1007/s10551-009-0319-2

Cited by 28 publications

(26 citation statements)

References 14 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…Research since the Academy of Management Review special topic forum has examined processes of corruption normalization (Palmer, 2008;Spicer, 2009), sources and processes of organizational diffusion and escalation (Fleming and Zyglidopoulos, 2009;Fleming and Zyglidopoulos, 2008;Zyglidopoulos and Fleming, 2008;, and corruption's causes and outcomes (Greve et al, 2010;Palazzo et al, 2012;Zyglidopoulos, 2016). …”

Section: Insert Tablementioning

confidence: 99%

A Bitter Pill? Institutional Corruption and the Challenge of Antibribery Compliance in the Pharmaceutical Sector

Dávid-Barrett

Yakis‐Douglas

Moss-Cowan

et al. 2017

Journal of Management Inquiry

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

We investigate why top-down directives aimed at eradicating corruption are ineffective at altering on-the-ground practices for organizations that have adopted industry-wide "gold standards" to prevent bribery and corruption. Using interview and focus group data collected from leading multinational pharmaceutical firms, we unearth antecedents contributing to organizations' systemic failure to embed their anticorruption policies in business practice.We identify two tensions that contribute to this disconnect: a culture clash between global and local norms, especially in emerging markets and a similar disconnect between the compliance and commercial functions. To overcome these tensions, we suggest that organizations are likely to find it easier to implement a no gifts policy if they cease to rely on local agents embedded in local norms and that there needs to be strong evidence of boardlevel commitment to antibribery programs, innovative ways of incentivizing compliant behavior, and a fundamental rethinking of organizations' business model and remuneration practices.

show abstract

Section: Insert Tablementioning

confidence: 99%

A Bitter Pill? Institutional Corruption and the Challenge of Antibribery Compliance in the Pharmaceutical Sector

Dávid-Barrett

Yakis‐Douglas

Moss-Cowan

et al. 2017

Journal of Management Inquiry

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…It is clear that both the formal and informal institutions present within a country can see corruption normalised, as corrupt behaviours spread and intensify to a point where it is expected and accepted although not necessarily morally approved (Spicer 2009). Indeed, it is the interplay between formal and informal institutions which allows corruption to persist (Vorley and Williams, 2016).…”

Section: Institutional Interplay and Corruptionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…If I pay €100 to get a license sorted I don't really worry about it … it is not right but it does not act as a major barrier" (INT12). In this sense, the formal institutions are permeated with informal practices in that corrupt practices are expected and accepted (Spicer 2009). As Tonoyan et al (2010) state, if the perception is that corruption is rife, the expectation will be that the 'moral costs' are low in terms of being socially sanctioned.…”

Section: Institutions As Catalysts Of Corruptionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The nature of corruption affecting entrepreneurship in transition economies: Some lessons from Montenegro

Williams

Radević

Gherhes

et al. 2017

South East European Journal of Economics and Business

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

The aim of this paper is to examine how the institutional environment impacts the nature of corruption affecting entrepreneurship in transition economies. Drawing on a survey and in-depth interviews with entrepreneurs in Montenegro, the paper finds that corruption is a pervasive presence which has not been ameliorated despite economic reforms. Montenegro is a transition economy which has made significant strides in terms of creating a more open market economy. However, reforms have often overlooked corruption which remains prevalent, and the institutional environment has left space for officials and entrepreneurs to engage in corrupt practices. The paper shows that although it takes different forms, corruption can be viewed as a cultural impediment even if the majority of entrepreneurs are not exposed to it.

show abstract

“…Third, revising the norms and values that encourage and/ or tolerate second-order corruption is often hard because these values and norms are embedded in an organization's ethical culture, the shared understandings of organizational members regarding ethical conduct (Trevino, 1986(Trevino, , 1990, and they have become normalized with time (Anand et al, 2004;Spicer, 2009). According to Schaubroeck et al (2012), organizational leaders can directly and indirectly influence the ethical culture of their organization.…”

Section: It Is Harder To Stop Second-order Corruptionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Toward a Theory of Second-Order Corruption

Zyglidopoulos

2015

Journal of Management Inquiry

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

EssayTransparency International (2011) defines corruption "as the abuse of entrusted power for private gain," and based on this understanding, many authors have applied similar definitions of corruption in fields of both management and politics. Within the field of management, Anand, Ashforth, and Joshi (2004) see corruption as the "misuse of an organizational position or authority for personal gain" (p. 40), and others agree that corruption involves the violation of rules for personal or group gain (Clarke, 1983;Williams, 2000). In the field of politics, Bratsis (2003) defines corruption as the subversion of the public good by private self-interest. Underlying all these rather similar definitions of corruption and fundamental to the way many management and political science scholars use the concept is the notion of "abuse of power."In this article, drawing on the possible interpretations of this "abuse of power," I argue that two kinds of corruption, which I refer to as first-order corruption and second-order corruption, can be identified. First-order corruption is the abuse of power by either individuals or groups for private gain given a system of existing rules or norms, whereas second-order corruption is the abuse of power by individuals or groups in that they change the existing rules or norms to unfairly benefit from them. For example, when an executive lies about the profitability of her corporation so that she can receive a greater bonus at the end of the year, she engages in first-order corruption. However, when the same executive uses her power on the board of directors to arrange her compensation rules in such a way that she always receives a bonus regardless of her performance as head of the corporation, she engages in second-order corruption, because this use of a bonus contradicts its main purpose, the alignment of the financial interests of the executive with the interests of the corporation's shareholders. In other words, in the first case, she breaks the rules, whereas in the second, she shapes (re-writes) them in such a way that they unfairly benefit her.Second-order corruption is important because of certain unique characteristics it has that make it harder to identify and more harmful for the corporation and society in the long run. First, second-order corruption is subtler than first-order corruption, which makes it harder to detect. Second, it tends to be systematically invisible, either because it has a cover of legality, or because it is hidden behind many other complex rules and procedures. Third, second-order corruption can be much more serious/central than first-order corruption, because those who can engage in it-those who can influence the rules so that they receive an unfair advantage-are almost always very high up in the food chain and would be unlikely to engage in second-order corruption for trivial sums or matters. Moreover, second-order corruption often plays a central role in the building of unethical systems within business organizations. Second-order corruption can therefor...

show abstract

The Normalization of Corrupt Business Practices: Implications for Integrative Social Contracts Theory (ISCT)

Abstract: integrative social contracts theory (ISCT), corruption, normalization, social norms,

Cited by 28 publications

References 14 publications

A Bitter Pill? Institutional Corruption and the Challenge of Antibribery Compliance in the Pharmaceutical Sector

A Bitter Pill? Institutional Corruption and the Challenge of Antibribery Compliance in the Pharmaceutical Sector

The nature of corruption affecting entrepreneurship in transition economies: Some lessons from Montenegro

Toward a Theory of Second-Order Corruption

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About