The New Politics of Sinn Féin

The changing face of party policy selection in post-devolution Northern Ireland

“…Some in Sinn Féin referred to healthy levels of policy debate at branch level, leading to strict 'mandation' (interview, 22 April 2013). However, while extensive deliberation at branch level is in keeping with other accounts which stress the high-rate of grassroots activism in Sinn Féin (Maillot, 2005;Bean, 2007), the majority of interviewees accepted that such an ideal was often at the mercy of practical organisational realities and inconsistencies. A more likely scenario, therefore, appears to be that on account of the large number of motions debated -on average 150-200 -delegates will only be mandated on contentious issues (interview, 9 April 2013).…”

Defeated by Popular Demand: Public Support and Counterterrorism in Three Western Democracies, 1963–1998

“…112 Thousands attended the funerals of the PIRA members killed at Loughgall and the "Loughgall Martyrs," as they have become known, continue to be a rallying point for militant Republicanism. 113 Although no polls or surveys directly related to the incident could be found, data on public opinion collated by Hewitt shows a clear and continuous rise in Northern Irish Catholic support for Irish unity during the 1980s. 114 If taken as a measure of (indirect) support for the PIRA's goals, the SAS operation did not appear to negatively affect the terrorists' popular legitimacy.…”

Structural Integrity and Cohesion in Insurgent Organizations: Evidence from Protracted Conflicts in Ireland and Burma1

“…The IRA is one of the most extensively studied armed organizations in the world. Most of the emphasis has been on the period 1969–2007, commonly known as the Troubles , during which time more than 3,600 people lost their lives (Bean 2007). By the early 1960s in Northern Ireland, severe state repression had dealt a major blow to the IRA’s continued existence as a military force.…”

“…Meanwhile, the PIRA would remain intact until 1986. Following on from the decision to wage a long war, the leader of Sinn Féin, the PIRA’s political wing, Gerry Adams, and his close confidents were convinced by the electoral success of Sinn Féin’s capitalization on the 1981 hunger strikes that a political solution to the conflict was both feasible and necessary (Beresford 1989; Bean 2007). However, Adams was well aware of the failures of past attempts to persuade Republicans of the virtues of participatory politics (Moloney 2002).…”

“…22 The Adams‐McGuinness leadership had to devise a way in which to move toward politics, but to minimize disintegration and avoid fragmentation. Instead of suggesting an abandonment of the armed struggle, Adams and the Northern leadership proposed a (albeit self‐contradictory) policy of the “ballot paper and the Armalite.” Danny Morrison, an IRA strategist, describes his articulation of the new strategy at the 1981 Ard Fheis as follows (Bean 2007:63), “I had to convince a lot of IRA people… [and] reassure them that by taking part in electoral politics there was not going to be any diminution in the armed struggle… I wasn’t being deceptive, because at that stage I still saw armed struggle as being the priority.” What this meant was that while Sinn Féin would contest elections and take up parliamentary seats, the military wing would supposedly escalate the armed struggle. Moloney (2002:292) describes the mood, “With tons of weaponry stored away and many middle‐ranking IRA activists aware that a big offensive was in the pipeline, the notion that Adams was about to sell out just seemed absurd.” By giving the rank and file what they wanted, that is, more guns, Adams was able to convince them of the leadership’s bona fides.…”