Structural Integrity and Cohesion in Insurgent Organizations: Evidence from Protracted Conflicts in Ireland and Burma1

Abstract

Why insurgent organizations stay together over time and why they maintain the fight under stress are questions of major concern for our understanding of war duration, conduct, and outcome. Structural integrity is the property of an organization remaining as a single intact entity, while cohesion refers to the creation and maintenance of cooperative effort toward the attainment of the organization’s goals. Although closely related, the conflation of structural integrity and cohesion is problematic. The body of the paper is a structured comparative analysis of two cases, the Irish Republican Army and the Karen National Union. First, this analysis demonstrates that cohesion and structural integrity are discrete concepts that each helps us to understand part of why, and how, insurgent organizations keep up the fight. Thus, despite much recent emphasis on “spoilers” in the conflict literature, understanding why armed organizations stay together or fragment is not enough. We also need to understand what makes insurgents perform effectively in the organization’s interest. Second, it points to some limitations of existing theories of structural integrity and cohesion in insurgent organizations and allows the author to conclude by suggesting some fruitful avenues for future research on these dynamics.

A Plague of Initials: Fragmentation, Cohesion, and Infighting in Civil Wars

“…Others explore fragmentation through computational models (e.g . Cederman 2008), or by looking at particular organizational characteristic in rebel groups (Gates 2002, Sinno 2008, Staniland 2009, Wood 2009, Kenny 2010.…”

“…Others explore fragmentation through computational models (e.g. Cederman 2008), or by looking at particular organizational characteristic in rebel groups (Gates 2002, Sinno 2008, Staniland 2009, Wood 2009, Kenny 2010). Often missing, however, is an account of how rebel organizations interact with other parties claiming to represent the same community.…”

Rethinking Ripeness Theory: Explaining Progress and Failure in Civil War Negotiations in the Philippines and Colombia

“…It adds to an existing literature that has revisited ripeness theory (Kloeiber 1994;Aggestam 2004;Pruitt 2005;O'Kane 2006, Amer 2007, Kreutz 2012Urlacher 2013). It also ties in with a growing literature on rebel group fragmentation and its effects on conflict processes (Kenny 2010;Asalm et al 2012;Cunningham 2006;Pearlman & Cunningham 2012;Bakke et al 2012;Cunningham 2013). Finally, the article provides qualitative evidence of internal dynamics inside rebel groups in a scholarship that is Walch International Negotiation 21 (2016) 75-103 mostly quantitatively orientated, responding to a call from previous research to explore these complicated dynamics and concepts through case studies (c.f.…”

Managing Insurgency

“…Additionally, I explain when and how insurgent groups succeed or fail in managing their personnel. Many insurgent groups collapse due to infighting and organizational dysfunction (Kenny 2010;Bakke, Cunningham, and Seymour 2012;Fjelde and Nilsson 2012;Cunningham, Bakke, and Seymour 2012). I show how policies such as targeting insurgent leadership and denying them safe havens can aggravate their agency problems, and this in turn can make the group less effective and even lead to collapse.…”