The Network Game: Analyzing Network-Formation and Interaction Strategies in Tandem

Hartmann, Björn-Oliver; Böhm, Klemens; Vogt, Bodo

doi:10.1109/wiiat.2008.22

Cited by 1 publication

(1 citation statement)

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“…• Threshold Strategies: Humans cooperate with others only if they process a certain number of their requests, i.e., humans set contactC to some value v. The same is known for choosing contacts [27], i.e., humans normally set additionalCC to some value. Thus, we can describe strategies known from literature by our strategy set, as well as many other strategies.…”

Section: E Strategy Spacementioning

confidence: 99%

Towards Efficient Equilibria of Combinations of Network-Formation and Interaction Strategies

Hartmann

Böhm

2010

2010 IEEE/WIC/ACM International Conference on Web Intelligence and Intelligent Agent Technology

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Abstract-Agents in networks have two strategic choices: They can forward/process incoming service requests -or not, and they can establish additional contacts and maintain or terminate existing ones. In other words, an agent can choose both an action-selection and a link-selection strategy. So far, it is unclear which equilibria exist in such settings. We show that there are the following equilibria: First, an inefficient one where agents leave the network. Second, an equilibrium where agents process requests on behalf of others, i.e., they cooperate. In this second equilibrium, agents distribute their contacts uniformly, which is not efficient. We show that a strategy, we propose in this paper, yields an equilibrium that is optimal, i.e., that yields the highest sum of payoffs over all equilibria. If agents base their link-selection decisions on the processing times of their requests, optimal system states can be equilibria.

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Section: E Strategy Spacementioning

confidence: 99%