The Nature of Sympathy

Scheler, Max; McAleer, Graham

doi:10.4324/9781315133348

Cited by 104 publications

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“…It is at the basis of what he terms the "we-relationship" or "living social relationship", which is the central concept in his account of experiential sharing. In consonance with a view to be found in other classical phenomenologists (Stein 2010a(Stein [1917, Scheler 1954Scheler [1912, Merleau-Ponty 2002[1945), and which has seen a revival in recent years (Zahavi 2011, Gallagher 2008, Smith 2010, Krueger 2012, León 2013, he endorses the idea that the experience of the bodily mindedness of others is prior to and more fundamental than any understanding of others that draws on imaginative projection, memory or theoretical knowledge (1967,101). We only start to employ the latter strategies when we are already convinced that we are facing minded creatures, but are simply unsure about precisely how we are to interpret the expressive phenomena in question.…”

Section: Alfred Schutzmentioning

confidence: 53%

“…The infinite regress objection relies on the possibility of empathically apprehending empathic experiences; to put it differently, it relies on the possibility of iterative empathy. Since Walther acknowledges that A's and B's respective experiences described in 4 and 4a are partially founded upon iterative empathy (1923, 85. Cf.…”

Section: Gerda Walthermentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The contemporary debate on collective intentionality in analytic philosophy has spanned three decades, but questions concerning the structure of experiential sharing (broadly construed) and social reality have obviously been a long-standing concern in philosophy, and, as it happens, also in classical phenomenology (Scheler 1954(Scheler [1912, Schutz 1967Schutz [1932, Walther 1923, Gurwitsch 2012[1931], Stein 2010a[1917], 2010b, Husserl (1973, 1952), von Hildebrand (1975[1930). …”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Phenomenology of Experiential Sharing: The Contribution of Schutz and Walther

Felipe

Zahavi

2016

Studies in the Philosophy of Sociality

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Section: Alfred Schutzmentioning

confidence: 53%

Section: Gerda Walthermentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Phenomenology of Experiential Sharing: The Contribution of Schutz and Walther

Felipe

Zahavi

2016

Studies in the Philosophy of Sociality

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“…But others press for a necessary transcendence of manufactured and mediated representations and words toward greater imagination (Carbaugh, 2007) and caution against simply co-opting existing terms from human linguistics (ScottPhillips, 2015). Instead, we need to learn the 'grammar of expression' that is specific to natural creatures, an understanding that is both intellectual and emotional (Scheler, 1970). …”

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confidence: 99%

Solidarity Between Human and Non-Human Animals: Representing Animal Voices in Policy Deliberations

Essen

Allen

2017

Environmental Communication

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In this paper, we discuss the bridging potential of "interspecies" solidarity between the often incommensurable ethics of care and justice. Indeed, we show that the Environmental Communication literature emphasizes feelings of care and compassion as vectors of responsibility taking for animals. But we also show that a growing field of Political AnimalRights suggest that such responsibility taking should instead be grounded in universalizable terms of justice. Our argument is that a dual conception of solidarity can bridge this divide: On the one hand, solidarity as a pre-political relation with animals and, on the other hand, as a political practice based on open public deliberation of universalizable claims to justice; that is, claims to justice advanced by human proxy representatives of vulnerable non-humans. Such a dual conception can both challenge and validate NGOs' claims to "speak on behalf of animals" in policy following the Aarhus Convention, indeed underwriting the Convention by insights from internatural communication in solidarity as relation, and by subjecting it to rational scrutiny in mini-publics in solidary as practice.KEYWORDS: Solidarity, internatural communication, discourse ethics, proxy representation, mini-publics Pre-production version of manuscript published in Journal of Environmental Communication http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10. 1080/17524032.2016.1269820 2 Solidarity between Human and Non-Human Animals: Representing Animal Voices in Policy DeliberationsWhile perhaps equally important in defining our relationships to vulnerable others, the concepts of care and justice are often presented as in profound tension with one another (Noddings, 1984;Gilligan, 1987;Okin, 1989). On the one hand, it is thought that such relationships must be based on feelings of care and empathetic understanding of the needs andinterests of the vulnerable who cannot, for one reason or another, rationally formulate or articulate their own good (Goodin, 1986;Donovan, 1996;Fineman, 2008). On the other hand, it is thought that our relationship and responsibility-taking for vulnerable others must be based on universalizable claims to justice; claims that gain validity through rational argumentative defenses against skeptical challenges concerning what the vulnerable need and what they are properly owed (Regan, 1995;Garner, 2012). Indeed, the rational universalizability of claims to rights and justice proves essential to the task of giving public justification to policy decisions concerning vulnerable members of the shared political community (Goodin, 1996). Here, the tension between the concepts of care and justice derives from a difference in emphasis regarding the basis of moral responsibility (Buchanan, 2013). This is the difference between developing feelings of being responsible for vulnerable others and defending before a universal audience of all those who are purportedly placed under an obligation that they should to take responsibility.Such a tension between care and justice is by no mean limited ...

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“…If anyone tells me that this is not 'perception' [of the emotion itself], for it cannot be so, in view of the fact that a perception is simply a 'complex of physical sensations', and that there is certainly on sensation of another person's mind nor any stimulus from such a source, I would be him to turn aside from such questionable theories and address himself to the phenomenological facts. 18 According to Scheler, we see the mental states of others within the dynamics of their expressive behavior. This is significant because it means that there is no need to posit an additional extra-perceptual cognitive mechanism (analogical inference, etc.)…”

Section: James Writesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Dewey's Rejection of the Emotion/Expression Distinction

Krueger¹

Neuroscience, Neurophilosophy and Pragmatism

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organism in nature, the brain in the nervous system, the cortex in the brain is the answer to the problems which haunt philosophy". 1 More specifically, Dewey appropriates Darwin's naturalistic portrayal of emotions as reflected in bodily habits, or still-developing habits, oriented toward some practical end. For Dewey-following Darwin-emotions are aspects of ongoing patterns of action through which an organism successfully negotiates its biosocial world. This is their adaptive utility. 2 Dewey argues further that this agentive characterization of emotions, as we might term it, helps clarify their intentional character. Emotions involve an orientation or attitude toward some object or state of affairs: "[T]he full emotional experience…is always "about" or "toward" something; it is "at" or "on account of" something, and this prepositional reference is an integral phase of the single pulse of emotion". 3 Their teleological mooring is what distinguishes emotions from free-floating affect. For Dewey, emotions are thus both directed toward, and responsive to, features of the environment. Accordingly, highlighting the agentive and intentional character of emotions, Dewey insists, helps account both for the rationality of the behaviors associated with them as well as their capacity to further individual and communal life (i.e., their evolutionary significance) (Cunningham 1995, 866). As Dewey puts it-again following Darwin-emotional behaviors have been selected in virtue of their usefulness not merely for expressing felt experiences but rather for their utility "qua acts-as serving life", that is, as acts that have proven useful in the larger struggle for survival. 4 Emotions are in this way part and parcel of our situated agency.Despite this positive appropriation, Dewey nevertheless rejects parts of Darwin's theory.Specifically, Dewey rejects Darwin's serial characterization of "the relation of emotion to organic peripheral action [i.e., expression], in that it assumes the former as prior and the latter as secondary". 5According to Darwin, the emotion itself-its affective core, its felt aspect-exists antecedently to and independently from its behavioral expression. While bodily habits and specific behaviors reflect emotions, they are not, strictly speaking, parts of the emotions they reflect. Accordingly, emotions are

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The Nature of Sympathy

Cited by 104 publications

References 0 publications

Phenomenology of Experiential Sharing: The Contribution of Schutz and Walther

Phenomenology of Experiential Sharing: The Contribution of Schutz and Walther

Solidarity Between Human and Non-Human Animals: Representing Animal Voices in Policy Deliberations

Dewey's Rejection of the Emotion/Expression Distinction

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