The Nature of Disease

Reznek, Lawrie

doi:10.4324/9781003283706-5

Cited by 4 publications

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“…The concept of “kind,” a central notion in ontology, plays a significant role in two key aspects of health care disciplines: “disease” and “categories/types of patients.” While the concept of “disease” has received considerable attention from researchers in the philosophy of science and philosophy of medicine (e.g., Amoretti and Lalumera 2020 for the concept of disease in the time of COVID), with its epistemological characteristics examined extensively (Reznek 1987; Hesslow 1993; Lemoine 2013; Schwartz 2007; Sulmasy 2005; Dragulinescu 2010), the concept of “categories/types of patients” remains ontologically elusive and has not yet received sufficient scrutiny (see Hadorn 1997; Beebee and Sabbarton‐Leary 2010 for the case of psychiatric kinds of patients; Valore 2017a). The application of ontological analysis to the notion of kinds of patients can provide several benefits.…”

Section: The Second Illustrative Case: Clinical Practice and Access T...mentioning

confidence: 99%

Ontological relativity and conceptual analysis as theoretical frameworks for epistemic injustice: Exploring applications

Valore

2024

Metaphilosophy

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This article introduces a novel theoretical framework for addressing epistemic injustice—a phenomenon where certain groups or individuals are systematically excluded from knowledge creation and dissemination processes—by employing ontological relativity and conceptual analysis. “Ontological relativity” refers to a philosophical perspective that posits our understanding of reality as being shaped by our toolbox of concepts, categories, language, and social practices; “conceptual analysis” is a method of inquiry that involves the rigorous examination and deconstruction of a particular concept or set of concepts in order to uncover their constituent elements, relationships, and underlying assumptions. To exemplify the effectiveness of the ontology‐based approach, two paradigmatic applications are explored: (a) educational practices and (b) clinical practice and access to health care. Through the presentation of these applications and the step‐by‐step illustration of the applied methodology, the aim of the article is to showcase the efficacy of ontology in tackling epistemic injustices, suggesting innovative paths for future research in this domain.

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Section: The Second Illustrative Case: Clinical Practice and Access T...mentioning

confidence: 99%

Ontological relativity and conceptual analysis as theoretical frameworks for epistemic injustice: Exploring applications

Valore

2024

Metaphilosophy

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“…Finalmente, las aproximaciones puramente normativistas al concepto de 'trastorno' plantean que los trastornos son estados disvaliosos, porque producen daño o constituyen desventajas para el individuo que los padece. En ese sentido, 'trastorno' depende de intereses humanos sin ser por ello arbitrario o meramente ficcional (Reznek, 1987;Nordenfelt, 2018), pero abre la puerta a una sobrepatologización justificada por criterios culturales. Por ejemplo, si la fealdad percibida de un individuo le produce sufrimiento y además desventajas para realizar sus metas personales en su comunidad, ¿debiese ser considerada un trastorno y prescribirse cirugía cosmética facial?…”

Section: Vaguedad Y Patologicidad: Desacuerdos Conceptuales En Torno ...unclassified

Reconceptualizar los trastornos de personalidad

Becerra

2022

Culturas Científicas

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El concepto de trastorno mental permite justificar intervenciones médicas, psicológicas y judiciales. Además, facilita a la/el consultante acceder a tratamientos mediante reembolsos o programas de salud pública, y por otro lado, podría conllevar estereotipos sociales. No obstante, el significado de dicho concepto no ha dejado de suscitar debate. En el presente artículo argumentaré que los trastornos de personalidad, tal como son definidos en el DSM-5, no cumplen con los criterios de patología de las propuestas principales (i.e. teoría bio-estadística de la salud, disfunción dañina, o entidad patológica) debido a tres razones independientes: (i) no se han propuesto dis/funciones a la base de cada trastorno y, dado el estado del arte de la psicología evolucionista, es poco probable que se pueda llevar a cabo ese programa en el futuro; (ii) el concepto de daño (distrés, perjuicio) aplicable a los trastornos de personalidad es constitutivamente social (aunque no exclusivamente social), por lo que resulta más adecuado hablar de grados de discapacidad que de trastornos del individuo; y (iii) que la ausencia de condiciones patognomónicas para cada trastorno, junto a la elevada comorbilidad y multimorbilidad entre trastornos de personalidad, horada la validez de la nosología actual y de los diagnósticos diferenciales. Propondré como solución la eliminación de los trastornos de personalidad de la nosología psiquiátrica. Eliminar los trastornos de personalidad no equivale a desconocer el sufrimiento de las personas diagnosticadas, ni a ignorar que dicho sufrimiento precede a, –y no acaba con la disolución de– la etiqueta diagnóstica. Por ello, se propondrá una reconceptualización de dicho sufrimiento en términos de discapacidad, entendida desde el modelo social, y que no presupone patología.

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“…As Millikan puts it: "Clusters … may fail to exhibit universal distinguishing properties so as to fall under necessary descriptions" (2017, 13). 11 Notably, Millikan cites disease as an example of a "real category" (2017).12 In The Nature of Disease Lawrie Reznek argues forcefully that diseases or pathological conditions do not, as a class, constitute a natural kind(Reznek 1987). He leaves it open, however, that individual disease types form natural kinds.…”

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confidence: 99%

What We Argue about when We Argue about Disease

Fagerberg

2023

philmed

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The disease debate in philosophy of medicine has traditionally been billed as a debate over the correct conceptual analysis of the term “disease.” This paper argues that although the debate’s participants overwhelmingly claim to be in the business of conceptual analysis, they do not tend to argue as if this is the case. In particular, they often show a puzzling disregard for key parameters such as precise terminology, linguistic community, and actual usage. This prima facie strange feature of the debate points to an interesting and potentially instructive hypothesis: the disease debate makes little sense within the paradigm of conceptual analysis but makes good sense on the assumption that pathology is a real kind.

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The Nature of Disease

Cited by 4 publications

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Ontological relativity and conceptual analysis as theoretical frameworks for epistemic injustice: Exploring applications

Ontological relativity and conceptual analysis as theoretical frameworks for epistemic injustice: Exploring applications

Reconceptualizar los trastornos de personalidad

What We Argue about when We Argue about Disease

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