2010
DOI: 10.1080/14781150903488020
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The Naga intra-community dialogue: preventing and managing violent ethnic conflict

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Cited by 4 publications
(2 citation statements)
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“…30 Even before the ceasefire was concluded, then, state actors engaged in a series of violent and non-violent efforts to reshape the terms and rules underpinning the emerging ceasefire order. [Insert Table Four: Pre-Ceasefire Order Negotiation, 1994-1997 Although the Indian government pushed the group towards talks, the NSCN-IM's growing presence in the contiguous Naga-inhabited areas, tied to its demand for 'Greater Nagalim,' had a crucial bearing on how state-insurgent order would emerge and then fragment in the post-1997 ceasefire period. Delhi's preference for a quick reduction in hostilities against central security forces left unresolved ambiguities that presented opportunities for the NSCN-IM to consolidate local influence, contest that of rivals and attempt to re-shape the terms of the post-ceasefire peace talks in its favour.…”
Section: Pre-ceasefire (1994-1997): Faits Accomplis and The Negotiati...mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…30 Even before the ceasefire was concluded, then, state actors engaged in a series of violent and non-violent efforts to reshape the terms and rules underpinning the emerging ceasefire order. [Insert Table Four: Pre-Ceasefire Order Negotiation, 1994-1997 Although the Indian government pushed the group towards talks, the NSCN-IM's growing presence in the contiguous Naga-inhabited areas, tied to its demand for 'Greater Nagalim,' had a crucial bearing on how state-insurgent order would emerge and then fragment in the post-1997 ceasefire period. Delhi's preference for a quick reduction in hostilities against central security forces left unresolved ambiguities that presented opportunities for the NSCN-IM to consolidate local influence, contest that of rivals and attempt to re-shape the terms of the post-ceasefire peace talks in its favour.…”
Section: Pre-ceasefire (1994-1997): Faits Accomplis and The Negotiati...mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…This is a Marxist Christian revolutionary force. 'Nagaland for Christ', has been one of the slogans of one of the factional groups of the NSCN [34]. Many of these insurgent groups have followed the political ideology of 'Nagalim' or the attempt to create what many Naga people see as a 'greater Nagaland'.…”
Section: The Indian Northeast: Background To the Conflictmentioning
confidence: 99%