The Moral Economy of Somali Piracy – Organised Criminal Business or Subsistence Activity?

Abstract

Somali piracy is increasingly explained in terms of organised criminal business. This article argues that piracy does not constitute a business and the analogy with organised crime is misleading and can obstruct the search for a long term settlement. Dismissing the underlying grievance, the destruction of Somali fisheries by foreign trawlers, with literalist explanations such as ‘pirates are rarely fishermen’ and ‘most targets are cargo ships’, ignores its function as a ‘legitimating notion’. The concept of ‘moral economy’ is used to explain how along the coast but also within the diaspora the identity of Somalis as victims is used to legitimize pirate activities. International responses should therefore focus actively and symbolically on reconstructing livelihoods along the coast, instead of seeking security sector and criminal justice solution. This is possible and cost effective because Somali piracy is a subsistence activity driven by lack of employment and investment opportunities, and provides a limited economic stimulus for coastal micro economies.

What is maritime security?

“…If the precise phrasing differs across agencies, the 2008 UN Secretary General's Report on Oceans and the Law of the Sea provides an outline of the threats commonly included ( [42], [18][19][20][21][22][23][24][25][26][27][28][29][30][31][32][33]. The report differentiates between seven.…”

“…3 See for instance the analysis of fisheries in Sierra Leone by Thorpe et al [38]. 4 See the discussion in Abbott and Renwick [1] and Klein [21] for the case of piracy.…”

European Union anti-piracy initiatives in the Horn of Africa: linking land-based counter-piracy with maritime security and regional development

“…Here, 'a potential reason for the explosion of piracy in Somali waters recently is that ecosystem justice as it relates to equity and fairness to local fishers in Somalia has been lacking' 24 . Pirates 'justified themselves as protesters against illegal fishing', though, in actuality, the danger of piracy lies in that 'pirates are rarely former fishermen, and … their aggression is directed at cargo ships, not intruding fishing vessels' 25 . These challenges result from and have produced a situation of chronic insecurity in Gulf of Aden waters alongside maritime terrorism, confusing matters by linking piracy to terrorism in much research, either through funding chains or through similar attack patterns.…”

“…It is a high risk and low profit activity, often trapping pirates into cycles of poverty and debt, in which young men take out loans from organised crime networks and warlords to pay for the cost of their lodgings, food and boats while waiting for an opportunity to work on a vessel. Even in Somalia's 'war ravaged economy', which has 'an estimated per capita GDP of US $298', 'piracy, with an estimated ransom income of US $20-40 million in 2008 and $70 million in 2009 … is of limited significance' 31 . As half of the proceeds go to the criminal investors who finance pirating expeditions, pirates themselves are left earning only $10,000-15,000 each per year, in a dangerous profession where, of the 5,000 pirates operating on average in the Gulf of Aden, a minimum of 7 per cent will die every year in confrontations or out on the open sea, while others will be arrested 32 .…”

Piracy studies: Academic responses to the return of an ancient menace

“…Critical researchers from various disciplines including anthropology and criminology, peace research or development studies have addressed piracy as form of local organized crime or social banditry (e.g. Hansen, 2009;Klein, 2013;Vagg, 1995). Others have problematized piracy as a question of structures and 'root causes'.…”