Robotics and autonomous systems are reshaping the world, changing healthcare, food production and biodiversity management. While they will play a fundamental role in delivering the UN Sustainable Development Goals, associated opportunities and threats are yet to be considered systematically. We report on a horizon scan evaluating robotics and autonomous systems impact on all Sustainable Development Goals, involving 102 experts from around the world. Robotics and autonomous systems are likely to transform how the Sustainable Development Goals are achieved, through replacing and supporting human activities, fostering innovation, enhancing remote access and improving monitoring. Emerging threats relate to reinforcing inequalities, exacerbating environmental change, diverting resources from tried-and-tested solutions and reducing freedom and privacy through inadequate governance. Although predicting future impacts of robotics and autonomous systems on the Sustainable Development Goals is difficult, thoroughly examining technological developments early is essential to prevent unintended detrimental consequences. Additionally, robotics and autonomous systems should be considered explicitly when developing future iterations of the Sustainable Development Goals to avoid reversing progress or exacerbating inequalities.
Piracy off the coast of Somalia has resulted in a steady decline in trade through the Arabian Sea and higher costs of doing business for multiple world regions. The EU has responded to the threat with a large scale anti-piracy operation in the Horn of Africa, which constitutes the first free-standing Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) military operation that is not entirely dependent on NATO planning and assets. The operation is designed to interdict Somali piracy operations across the Gulf of Aden and to keep some of the world's busiest sea lanes open for reasons of world trade. This article argues that the EU preoccupation with military solutions to the piracy problem, based on interventions through the Somali Federal Government with an emphasis on security, is insufficient because it fails to address the underlying causes of piracy and misunderstands the Somali socio-culturalsecurity nexus and the need for practical longer-term land-based approaches to development. The reduction of Somali piracy activities can be linked to this increased military response capacity as well as to increased security precautions undertaken by shipping companies: but none of these strategies have succeeded in dismantling piracy networks. They therefore offer only a temporary and costly stopgap measure.
Has the United Kingdom Brexit referendum been a catalyst for more European Union security cooperation? How significant are post-referendum initiatives in security and defence? What are the implications of Brexit for EU and UK security and defence? This article analyses EU post-Brexit strategic choices following the launch of the EU Global Strategy (2016). EU autonomy in security and defence requires close cooperation with third countries, including Norway and post-Brexit UK. It remains to be seen whether the EU and the UK can forge a new bespoke security and defence relationship that delivers mutual benefits through shared strategic ambitions, while also protecting their various interests. We suggest there will be serious collateral damage to UK-EU security and defence cooperation if post-Brexit trade negotiations descend into acrimony and mistrust, especially in the event of 'no-deal' once the 'transition period' ends. This would undermine European security and the EU's quest for strategic autonomy in world affairs and have serious implications for both UK and EU security. We conclude that the EU needs to work with the UK on a plan to achieve global strategic autonomy, or both risk reduced influence in the wider world in the years ahead.
The response to the Covid‐19 pandemic in 2020–21 was dominated by the Westphalian primacy of national territory and sovereignty, significantly worsening and prolonging this crisis. Global platforms for cross‐border coordination and cooperation were constrained by national self‐interest. Arguably, the lack of a worldwide supranational (or post‐Westphalian) authority in health governance is one important structural reason for the fragmented, chaotic, and ineffective response to Covid‐19. The failure of Westphalian governance responses to the pandemic provides a unique opportunity for post‐Westphalian governance structures to be established and contribute to reforming international pandemic preparedness. While this is unlikely to happen soon at the global level, a comprehensive framework is emerging at the European Union level in the form of a European Health Union. Through a combined conceptualisation of supranational governance and the securitisation process of international health crises, Covid‐19 has opened the door to post‐Westphalian health governance coordinated by the European Commission.
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