The Modernization of Factionalism in Chinese Politics

Abstract

The informal dimension has always been important in Chinese politics, due to a traditional bias against legalism and favoring the sentimentalization of personal qualities. We contend that it remains so still, albeit in altered form. Rather than being oriented solely to personal or in-group security, factionalism in the context of the more secure bureaucratic environment of the reform era has come to embrace policy goals and material interests as well. Thus, informal politics proliferates, and factional fortunes tend tofluctuateaccording to the patterns of China's political business cycle.In the post-Mao era the radical reformers led by Deng Xiaoping have favored rapid growth, even at the expense of stability. The conservatives surrounding Chen Yun consider stability the paramount goal, believing that it should override considerations of growth. The synchronization of reform and business cycles, plus the appearance of periodic social movements whenever the growth rate slumps, makes reformers and conservatives vulnerable to charges of mismanaging the economy for their respective policy preferences. As long as the business, reform, and movement cycles coincide, wide policyfluctuationsdriven by a politics of blame are inevitable.

Global Networks and the Two Faces of Chinese National Oil Companies

“…This observation warrants further research into the state-business nexus of China's transnationalizing corporations, for instance incorporating the existence and impact of Chinese elite factions (Shih 2008;Tsou 1995;also Pye 1995;Dittmer & Wu 1995), and research on quanxi, the more personalized and informal ties of trust, friendship/family and reciprocity distinctive of Chinese social relations (Gold et al 2002;Peverelli et al 2011;Wank 1999;Whyte 1995;Xin & Pearce 1996). In the final part of the article I will shed some light on the implications of the transnationalization of Chinese state-owned oil corpora tions and their directors in particular, and the contradictory outcomes that this dual commitment seems to produce.…”

The allocation mechanism of authority and accountability in Chinese government hierarchies: A case study of the “Earmarked Project System”

“…In addition, governance by procedural rules and regulations became increasingly significant in the Chinese government system. As the result of the abovementioned features of Chinese governance, one way to solve this dichotomy of progress and output of policy monitoring is by factions (Dittmer and Wu 1995). Faction members share group solidarity in ideology and general ideas.…”

Factions of Different Stripes: Gauging the Recruitment Logics of Factions in the Reform Period

“…As earlier generations of China scholars had observed, patron-client relationships developed over the course of a patron's career served as platforms whereby regime goods such as promotions and money for the clients were exchanged for political support for the patron (Dittmer and Wu 1995;Pye 1981). Due to the highly opaque nature of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), it was very difficult to establish whether factional ties played a role in key outcomes in the regime, including promotions and purges of top officials, as well as major policy changes.…”