The allocation mechanism of authority and accountability in Chinese government hierarchies: A case study of the “Earmarked Project System”

Abstract

Based on basic organizational theories, this paper revisits studies about intergovernmental relationships in China and proposes a systematic explanation framework from the perspective of the allocation mechanism of authority and accountability. The institutional feature of government organization is unfolded from two dimensions, authority and accountability. In China, the authority and accountability of different hierarchies are strongly related but not clearly defined. Theories such as "Federalism, Chinese Style" are the basis for different conditions. The trade-off between control and incentive, specification, and coordination should be given more consideration with optimal analyses. As the main accountability practicing mechanism, Cadre management from upper-layer hierarchies greatly affects the allocation mechanism between different hierarchies. However, the tournament theory about promotion lacks vision, empirical bases, and explanation power. This paper studies the project system from an organizational perspective and indicates that the subcontracting form differs from regional decentralization, which accentuates interdepartmental competition and expansion.

Political incentives in market-based environmental regulation: Evidence from China’s carbon emissions trading scheme

“…And the effectiveness of policy implementation often depends on the features of the allocation of authority and accountability in government hierarchies. When it comes to the distribution of intergovernmental authority, neither federalism nor extreme centralism can accurately illustrate the reality in China [ 46 ]. China's administrative system can be viewed from the following two perspectives.…”

Corporate environmental disclosure and local government environmental oversight in China

“…It has been debated and generally accepted that many environmental issues in China arise from the “race-to-the-bottom” for local economic development and inter-jurisdictional competition for business tax revenue (Wang and Wheeler, 2005; Jiang, 2006). Since China’s economic reform and fiscal decentralisation in the 1980s, the local economy has relied heavily on the revenue contribution made by local business enterprises and thus local governments have spared no effort in competing for business investments irrespective of their social and environmental impacts (Huang and Kung, 2010; Shi and Ni, 2017). Particularly when facing revenue–expenditure constraints and financial hardship, local/provincial governments are likely to show leniency to local companies when evaluating and overseeing environmental compliance (Chen et al , 2005).…”

“…In particular, the top leaders of local/provincial EPBs are nominated by local/provincial governments and then appointed by the Local People’s Congress or the Local People’s Congress Standing Committee, which means that local/provincial governments could significantly influence the political promotion of local/provincial EPB’s top leaders (Zeng, 2009). Also, the annual performance of local/provincial EPBs is reviewed by local/provincial governments (Pu, 2005) and local/provincial EPBs’ financial budgets are largely supported and reallocated by local/provincial governments (Shi and Ni, 2017). As work performance, distribution of financial resources and political promotion of top officials of local/provincial EPBs depend heavily on the assessment by local/provincial governments (Qi and Zhang, 2014), local/provincial EPBs are likely to have closer political connections with local/provincial governments than with the MEP at the Central level.…”

The Recruitment Process for Grassroots Cadres in a Chinese County: The CCP Organization Department and Its Alarm Function

“…Holding officials to account for their mistakes has become the norm in recent years, and the party has adjusted the indicators by which it assesses its cadres’ capacity to meet the needs of national development. Unlike in Western democracies, where officials are held to account at the ballot box, in China they are subject to punishment by higher-level leaders (Heimer, 2006; Shi and Ni, 2017). According to the principle of “the party manages cadres” 党管干部, and China’s nomenklatura system (Burns, 2006), the party committees have the biggest say in the appointment of personnel.…”