The Missing Incentive: Corruption, Anticorruption, and Reelection

Krastev, Ivan; Ganev, Georgy

doi:10.1057/9781403981103_9

Cited by 25 publications

(9 citation statements)

References 11 publications

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“…For evidence in the post-communist context, see for example Tucker 2006. 13 Abramo 2008; Donchev and Ujhelyi 2009. 14 Krastev and Ganev 2004; see also Olken 2009. 15 Mocan 2004;Morris 2008;Rose andMishler 2007.…”

Section: Pocketbook Corruption Vs Sociotropic Corruptionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…13 Abramo 2008Donchev and Ujhelyi 2009. 14 Krastev and Ganev 2004; see also Olken 2009. 15 Mocan 2004Morris 2008;Rose andMishler 2007.…”

Section: Pocketbook Corruption Vs Sociotropic Corruptionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…26 Kumlin and Esaiasson 2012. 27 Krastev and Ganev 2004;Munoz, Anduiza and Gallego 2013. 28 Ansolabehere and Snyder 2000;Green 2007;Stokes 1963. 2.3.2.…”

Section: Alternative Hypothesesmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Pocketbook vs. Sociotropic Corruption Voting

Klašnja

Tucker

Deegan‐Krause

2014

Brit. J. Polit. Sci.

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The article examines the relationship between corruption and voting behavior by defining two distinct channels: pocketbook corruption voting, i.e. how personal experiences with corruption affect voting behavior; and sociotropic corruption voting, i.e. how perceptions of corruption in society do so. Individual and aggregate data from Slovakia fail to support hypotheses that corruption is an undifferentiated valence issue, that it depends on the presence of a viable anti-corruption party, or that voters tolerate (or even prefer) corruption, and support the hypothesis that the importance of each channel depends on the salience of each source of corruption and that pocketbook corruption voting prevails unless a credible anti-corruption party shifts media coverage of corruption and activates sociotropic corruption voting. Previous studies may have underestimated the prevalence of corruption voting by not accounting for both channels.

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Section: Pocketbook Corruption Vs Sociotropic Corruptionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…13 Abramo 2008Donchev and Ujhelyi 2009. 14 Krastev and Ganev 2004; see also Olken 2009. 15 Mocan 2004Morris 2008;Rose andMishler 2007.…”

Section: Pocketbook Corruption Vs Sociotropic Corruptionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Pocketbook vs. Sociotropic Corruption Voting

Klašnja

Tucker

Deegan‐Krause

2014

Brit. J. Polit. Sci.

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“…The net benefits from some specific anti-corruption reforms seem to be quite high.Weighting benefits and costs more highly if they are experienced by the poor would only enhance the value of most policies.The problems are, first, setting priorities for a long term response and, second, overcoming the resistance of those who benefit from the status quo. Often even if the net benefits are large, the beneficiaries of the status quo are very powerful (Krastev andGanev 2004, Fries, Lysenko, Polanec 2003).…”

Section: Reform Proposalsmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Challenge of Poor Governance and Corruption

Rose‐Ackerman

2006

How to Spend $50 Billion to Make the World a Better Place

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A ll political systems need to mediate the relationship between private wealth and public power. Those that fail risk a dysfunctional government captured by wealthy interests. Corruption is one symptom of such failure with private willingness-to-pay trumping public goals. Private individuals and business firms pay to get routine services and to get to the head of the bureaucratic queue.They pay to limit their taxes, avoid costly regulations, obtain contracts at inflated prices, and get concessions and privatized firms at low prices. If corruption is endemic, public officials, both bureaucrats and elected officials, may redesign programs and propose public projects with few public benefits and many opportunities for private profit. Of course, corruption, in the sense of bribes, payoffs and kickbacks, is only one type of government failure. Efforts to promote "good governance" must be broader than anti-corruption campaigns. Governments may be honest but inefficient because no one has an incentive to work productively, and narrow elites may capture the state and exert excess influence on policy. Bribery might induce the lazy to work hard and permit those not in the inner circle of cronies to obtain benefits. However, even in such cases, corruption cannot be confined to "functional" areas. It will be a temptation whenever private benefits are positive. It may be a reasonable response to a harsh reality, but, over time, it can facilitate a spiral into an even worse situation. "Corruption" is a term whose meaning shifts with the speaker. It can describe the corruption of the young from watching violence on television or refer to political decisions that provide narrow benefits to one's constituents in the form, say, of a new road through the district. In short, speakers use the term to cover a range of

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“…4 4 Krastev and Ganev (2004) refer to this as “the missing incentive”: Governments either directly benefit from corruption or they fail to see the benefits of corruption control—at least, within a politically relevant period of time. …”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Political Cycles and Organizational Life Cycles: Delegation to Anticorruption Agencies in Central Europe

Batory

2012

Governance

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A large number of “independent” anticorruption agencies (ACAs) sprung up around the world in past decades. Yet little comparative work has been done to explain the diversity of their organizational forms or development trajectories. Using insights from regulatory theory and the regulation of government literature, this article argues that the formal powers and independence ACAs are granted crucially depend on whether external and/or domestic impetuses for setting them up can counterbalance governments' incentives for no action, or only symbolic action. The ACAs' initial mandate influences but does not determine how they fare in later life: Support or obstruction from ruling governments, their own ability to use strategic resources, and leadership shape the extent to which the agencies are able to carry out their tasks in practice. These arguments are examined through comparison of three ACAs in the European Union's “new” member states—Latvia, Poland, and Slovenia.

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The Missing Incentive: Corruption, Anticorruption, and Reelection

Cited by 25 publications

References 11 publications

Pocketbook vs. Sociotropic Corruption Voting

Pocketbook vs. Sociotropic Corruption Voting

The Challenge of Poor Governance and Corruption

Political Cycles and Organizational Life Cycles: Delegation to Anticorruption Agencies in Central Europe

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