Pocketbook vs. Sociotropic Corruption Voting

Klašnja, Marko; Tucker, Joshua A.; Deegan‐Krause, Kevin

doi:10.1017/s0007123414000088

Cited by 91 publications

(75 citation statements)

References 72 publications

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“…1 In a recent manuscript Klašnja et al (2014) put forward a similar idea like the one presented here. They used a parallel with economic voting and the distinction between sociotropic and pocketbook voting, suggesting that personal experiences with corruption (pocketbook corruption voting) and perceptions of the prevalence of corruption (sociotropic corruption voting) are two distinct mechanisms through which corruption voting works.…”

Section: Notesmentioning

confidence: 82%

“…Mechanisms that have been highlighted are the role of the media in disseminating information about malfeasance , the credible and serious challenge by opposition parties (Chang and Golden, 2004) or the increased salience of corruption as a product of the agenda-setting power of an anti-corruption party (Klašnja et al, 2014;cf. Krause and Méndez, 2009).…”

Section: Accountability and Corruptionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Elites, Institutions and the Quality of Government

Dahlström¹,

Wängnerud²

2015

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The Executive Politics and Governance series focuses on central government, its organisation and its instruments. It is particularly concerned with how the changing conditions of contemporary governing affect perennial questions in political science and public administration. Executive Politics and Governance is therefore centrally interested in questions such as how politics interacts with bureaucracies, how issues rise and fall on political agendas, and how public organisations and services are designed and operated. This book series encourages a closer engagement with the role of politics in shaping executive structures, and how administration shapes politics and policy-making. In addition, this series also wishes to engage with the scholarship that focuses on the organisational aspects of politics, such as government formation and legislative institutions.The series welcomes high-quality research-led monographs with comparative appeal. Edited volumes that provide in-depth analysis and critical insights into the field of Executive Politics and Governance are also encouraged.Palgrave Macmillan is the global academic imprint of the above companies and has companies and representatives throughout the world.Palgrave® and Macmillan® are registered trademarks in the United States, the United Kingdom, Europe and other countries.This book is printed on paper suitable for recycling and made from fully managed and sustained forest sources. Logging, pulping and manufacturing processes are expected to conform to the environmental regulations of the country of origin.A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication DataElites, institutions and the quality of government / edited by Carl Dahlström, Associate Professor, University of Gothenburg, Sweden ; Lena Wängnerud, Professor, University of Gothenburg, Sweden. pages cm. -(Executive politics and governance) Includes bibliographical references. Summary: "Elite politicians, bureaucrats and businessmen hold the fortunes of societies in their hands not only because of their direct influence on politics, administration and economy but also since their behavior indirectly signals how things are done. How are elites persuaded not to use their privileged position to enrich themselves at the expense of the society at large? The answer from research, so far, is through formal and informal institutional constraints, which in different ways alter incentives at the top. This edited volume contributes to the knowledge of the interaction between elites, institutions and other constraints and how this affects corruption and other forms of bad government. It problematizes the incentives for elites and masses to fight grand and petty corruption, respectively, and demonstrates the importance of elite constraints for good societies, where infant mortality is low and life expectancy and satisfaction are high. It also explores the behavior of a largely unconstrained elite group, namely the diplomatic corps, and shows how corru...

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Section: Notesmentioning

confidence: 82%

Section: Accountability and Corruptionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Elites, Institutions and the Quality of Government

Dahlström¹,

Wängnerud²

2015

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“…Direct exposure to corruption may have a stronger negative effect on individuals because they themselves must cope with all the associated troubles -a situation which may cause them to be more distrusting of the given ACA than they would be through perception-based learning about cases of corruption. Klašnja et al (2016) define these two types as Bpocketbook^and Bsociotropic^corruption and analyze the possible effect of them on voting behavior; they find that pocketbook corruption affects voting behavior. This means a personal experience of corruption may influence an individual in a way that creates distrust in the existing institutions, and that this is likely to be reflected in voting patterns.…”

Section: Corruption and Anti-corruption Agencies: Some Theoretical Inmentioning

confidence: 99%

Dynamics of Corruption and Citizens’ Trust in Anti-Corruption Agencies in Three South Asian Countries

Baniamin

Jamil

2017

Public Organiz Rev

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The comparative analyses of citizens' trust in Anti-Corruption Agencies (ACAs) in three countries' (Bangladesh, Nepal, and Sri Lanka) indicate that despite ACA's low level of effectiveness in curbing corruption, trust level varies. The Nepalese ACA has higher level of trust than Bangladesh and Sri Lanka which is earned by targeting mainly lower level public officials. Though it fails to reduce the level of corruption in Nepal; citizens tend to trust ACA more. This is because of higher visibility of ACA's activities. Such findings indicate about the methodological challenge to use 'trust' as a proxy to measure institutional performance.

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“…This suggests a general norm against corruption: citizens see corruption as wrong and view those engaged in it as unfit for office. But studies of actual voting behavior and electoral returns show that though malfeasant politicians often receive fewer votes than those not accused of corruption, the former still usually win reelection (Anduiza, Aina, and Muñoz ; Basinger ; Boas, Hidalgo, and Melo ; Carlson and Reed ; Chang, Golden, and Hill ; Chong et al ; Hamel and Miller ; Klašnja, Tucker, and Deegan‐Krause ; Peters and Welch ; Welch and Hibbing ). For example, Basinger () shows that 73% of scandal‐tainted legislators in the US House won their next primary election, and of those, 81% won the next general election.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Corruption, Party Leaders, and Candidate Selection: Evidence from Italy

Asquer

Golden

Hamel

2019

Legislative Studies Qtrly

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Corruption, Party Leaders, and Candidate Selection: Evidence from Italyresearch indicates that voters are not particularly effective at removing corrupt politicians from office, in part because voters make decisions on the basis of many competing factors. Party leaders are much more single-minded than voters and will choose to deselect implicated legislators if it means maintaining a positive party reputation and improving the odds of winning a legislative majority. We examine renominations to italy's legislature in two periods marked by corruption. We compare these renomination patterns with those from the prior legislature, when corruption lacked political salience. Our analysis shows that incumbent renominations are negatively associated with the number of press mentions that link the incumbent to corruption-but only when corruption is salient to the public. Our study highlights the importance of party leaders in forcing malfeasant legislators out of office-and reducing corruption-and redirects attention from voters to political elites as a critical channel in enforcing democratic accountability.

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Pocketbook vs. Sociotropic Corruption Voting

Cited by 91 publications

References 72 publications

Elites, Institutions and the Quality of Government

Elites, Institutions and the Quality of Government

Dynamics of Corruption and Citizens’ Trust in Anti-Corruption Agencies in Three South Asian Countries

Corruption, Party Leaders, and Candidate Selection: Evidence from Italy

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