Dynamics of Corruption and Citizens’ Trust in Anti-Corruption Agencies in Three South Asian Countries

Abstract

The comparative analyses of citizens' trust in Anti-Corruption Agencies (ACAs) in three countries' (Bangladesh, Nepal, and Sri Lanka) indicate that despite ACA's low level of effectiveness in curbing corruption, trust level varies. The Nepalese ACA has higher level of trust than Bangladesh and Sri Lanka which is earned by targeting mainly lower level public officials. Though it fails to reduce the level of corruption in Nepal; citizens tend to trust ACA more. This is because of higher visibility of ACA's activities. Such findings indicate about the methodological challenge to use 'trust' as a proxy to measure institutional performance.

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