The Metaphysics of Memory

Bernecker, Sven

doi:10.1007/978-1-4020-8220-7

Cited by 135 publications

(75 citation statements)

References 37 publications

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“…197-199). Causal dependence of an appropriate kind between present memory and past experience (Bernecker 2008;Martin and Deutscher 1966) does not require identity of point of view. Debus suggests that the transformation of spatial information evident in a genuine observer memory results precisely from the causal process that appropriately links experience and memory.…”

Section: Doubts About Observer Memoriesmentioning

confidence: 98%

Observer perspective and acentred memory: some puzzles about point of view in personal memory

Sutton

2010

Philos Stud

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Sometimes I remember my past experiences from an 'observer' perspective, seeing myself in the remembered scene. This paper analyses the distinction in personal memory between such external observer visuospatial perspectives and 'field' perspectives, in which I experience the remembered actions and events as from my original point of view. It argues that Richard Wollheim's related distinction between centred and acentred memory fails to capture the key phenomena, and criticizes Wollheim's reasons for doubting that observer 'memories' are genuine personal memories. Since field perspectives in personal memory are also likely to be the product of constructive processes, we should reject the common assumption that such constructive processes inevitably bring distortion and error. Yet field perspectives tend to be treated as privileged also in the domains of memory for skilled movement, and memory for trauma. In each case, it is argued that visuospatial perspective in personal memory should be distinguished from other kinds of perspective such as kinesthetic perspective and emotional perspective.

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Section: Doubts About Observer Memoriesmentioning

confidence: 98%

Observer perspective and acentred memory: some puzzles about point of view in personal memory

Sutton

2010

Philos Stud

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“…Initially resurrected by Martin and Deutscher (), and later articulated ‐ albeit disapprovingly ‐ by Norman Malcolm (), this view holds that for a mental representation to count as a memory trace, it needs to meet three conditions: (1) it must play a causal role in the recollection of the event it is a trace of; (2) it must retain the intentional content entertained during the remembered event; and (3) it must be structurally similar or isomorphic to the event that is remembered . In addition to these causal , retention , and similarity conditions, there is another, more subtle parallel between Aristotle's and the more recent view: both take memory traces to be theoretical entities whose presumed existence is the result of an inference to the best explanation (IBE), rather than non‐theoretical entities whose existence is determined observationally (Malcolm ; Heil ; Bernecker ; although see Rosen ). Aristotle's IBE posits memory traces to explain how we can entertain an intentional content in the present whose intentional object is in the past.…”

Section: The Need For Memory Tracesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…He does not come to the conclusion that they exist on the basis of having found them. Similarly, the more recent view posits the existence of memory traces, not on the basis of an empirical observation, but rather as an IBE that avoids acceptance of causation‐at‐a‐temporal distance between the experienced object/event and its subsequent recollection (Martin and Deustcher 1963; Sutton ; Bernecker , ; whether or not this IBE is tantamount to Aristotle's is an exercise left for the reader).…”

Section: The Need For Memory Tracesmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Nature of Memory Traces

Brigard

2014

Philosophy Compass

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Memory trace was originally a philosophical term used to explain the phenomenon of remembering. Once debated by Plato, Aristotle, and Zeno of Citium, the notion seems more recently to have become the exclusive province of cognitive psychologists and neuroscientists. Nonetheless, this modern appropriation should not deter philosophers from thinking carefully about the nature of memory traces. On the contrary, scientific research on the nature of memory traces can rekindle philosopher's interest on this notion. With that general aim in mind, the present paper has three specific goals. First, it attempts to chart the most relevant philosophical views on the nature of memory traces from both a thematic and historical perspective. Second, it reviews critical findings in the psychology and the neuroscience of memory traces. Finally, it explains how such results lend support to or discredit specific philosophical positions on the nature of memory traces. This paper also touches upon the issues raised by recent empirical research that theories of memory traces need to accommodate in order to succeed.

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“…See, e.g., Bernecker, , ch. 4; Sutton and Windhorst, ; and Michaelian, , for discussion of Martin and Deutscher's own proposal, as well as the presentation of some alternatives.…”

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confidence: 99%

Epistemic and non‐Epistemic Theories of Remembering

James

2016

Pacific Philosophical Qtr

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Contemporary memory sciences describe processes that are dynamic and constructive. This has led some philosophers to weaken the relationship between memory and epistemology; though remembering can give rise to epistemic success, it is not itself an epistemic success state. I argue that non-epistemic (causal) theories will not do; they provide neither necessary nor sufficient conditions for remembering that p. I also argue that the shortcomings of the causal theory are epistemic in nature. Consequently, a theory of remembering must account for both its fundamentally epistemic nature and for its constructive and dynamic processes.

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The Metaphysics of Memory

Cited by 135 publications

References 37 publications

Observer perspective and acentred memory: some puzzles about point of view in personal memory

Observer perspective and acentred memory: some puzzles about point of view in personal memory

The Nature of Memory Traces

Epistemic and non‐Epistemic Theories of Remembering

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