2008
DOI: 10.1007/978-1-4020-8220-7
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The Metaphysics of Memory

Abstract: No part of this work may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, microfilming, recording or otherwise, without written permission from the Publisher, with the exception of any material supplied specifically for the purpose of being entered and executed on a computer system, for exclusive use by the purchaser of the work.

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Cited by 135 publications
(75 citation statements)
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“…197-199). Causal dependence of an appropriate kind between present memory and past experience (Bernecker 2008;Martin and Deutscher 1966) does not require identity of point of view. Debus suggests that the transformation of spatial information evident in a genuine observer memory results precisely from the causal process that appropriately links experience and memory.…”
Section: Doubts About Observer Memoriesmentioning
confidence: 98%
“…197-199). Causal dependence of an appropriate kind between present memory and past experience (Bernecker 2008;Martin and Deutscher 1966) does not require identity of point of view. Debus suggests that the transformation of spatial information evident in a genuine observer memory results precisely from the causal process that appropriately links experience and memory.…”
Section: Doubts About Observer Memoriesmentioning
confidence: 98%
“…Initially resurrected by Martin and Deutscher (), and later articulated ‐ albeit disapprovingly ‐ by Norman Malcolm (), this view holds that for a mental representation to count as a memory trace, it needs to meet three conditions: (1) it must play a causal role in the recollection of the event it is a trace of; (2) it must retain the intentional content entertained during the remembered event; and (3) it must be structurally similar or isomorphic to the event that is remembered . In addition to these causal , retention , and similarity conditions, there is another, more subtle parallel between Aristotle's and the more recent view: both take memory traces to be theoretical entities whose presumed existence is the result of an inference to the best explanation (IBE), rather than non‐theoretical entities whose existence is determined observationally (Malcolm ; Heil ; Bernecker ; although see Rosen ). Aristotle's IBE posits memory traces to explain how we can entertain an intentional content in the present whose intentional object is in the past.…”
Section: The Need For Memory Tracesmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…He does not come to the conclusion that they exist on the basis of having found them. Similarly, the more recent view posits the existence of memory traces, not on the basis of an empirical observation, but rather as an IBE that avoids acceptance of causation‐at‐a‐temporal distance between the experienced object/event and its subsequent recollection (Martin and Deustcher 1963; Sutton ; Bernecker , ; whether or not this IBE is tantamount to Aristotle's is an exercise left for the reader).…”
Section: The Need For Memory Tracesmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…See, e.g., Bernecker, , ch. 4; Sutton and Windhorst, ; and Michaelian, , for discussion of Martin and Deutscher's own proposal, as well as the presentation of some alternatives.…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%