Epistemic and non‐Epistemic Theories of Remembering

James, Steven P.

doi:10.1111/papq.12157

Cited by 10 publications

(4 citation statements)

References 54 publications

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“…There are a few contemporary defenders of epistemic (James, 2017) and even empiricist (Byrne, 2010) theories of memory, but the overwhelming majority of philosophers of memory today endorse theories that recognizably descend from the causal theory of memory as formulated by Martin and Deutscher (Debus, 2017). It is on a subset of these that we focus here.…”

Section: Contentless Memory Traces and (Post)causal Theories Of Memorymentioning

confidence: 99%

Memory without content? Radical enactivism and (post)causal theories of memory

Michaelian

Sant’Anna

2019

Synthese

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Radical enactivism, an increasingly influential approach to cognition in general, has recently been applied to memory in particular, with Hutto and Peeters (2018) providing the first systematic discussion of the implications of the approach for mainstream philosophical theories of memory. Hutto and Peeters argue that radical enactivism, which entails a conception of memory traces as contentless, is fundamentally at odds with current causal and postcausal theories, which remain committed to a conception of traces as contentful: on their view, if radical enactivism is right, then the relevant theories are wrong. Partisans of the theories in question might respond to Hutto and Peeters' argument in two ways. First, they might challenge radical enactivism itself. Second, they might challenge the conditional claim that, if radical enactivism is right, then their theories are wrong. In this paper, we develop the latter response, arguing that, appearances to the contrary notwithstanding, radical enactivism in fact aligns neatly with an emerging tendency in the philosophy of memory: radical enactivists and causal and postcausal theorists of memory have begun to converge, for distinct but compatible reasons, on a contentless conception of memory traces. * Thanks for feedback to audiences at the Naturally Evolving Minds conference at the University of Wollongong in February 2018 and the Memory and Perception: Fishing for Connections workshop at the University of Otago in May 2018. Thanks also for written comments to Carl Craver and John Sutton and for extremely interesting reports to two referees.

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Section: Contentless Memory Traces and (Post)causal Theories Of Memorymentioning

confidence: 99%

Memory without content? Radical enactivism and (post)causal theories of memory

Michaelian

Sant’Anna

2019

Synthese

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“…Hence, if you can be recognised as remembering that p, then you are epistemically permissible to believe that p. Premise 2 is a variant of mEE‐K, according to which if you epistemically permissibly believe that p, then you can be recognised as knowing that p, provided that the norm of belief is knowledge. Putting premises 1 and 2 together, it can be concluded that whenever one can be recognised as remembering that p, one can also be recognised as knowing that p. In brief, remembering entails knowing, which is the central claim of the epistemic theory of knowledge (see James, 2017, p. 122 for a long list of proponents; see also Moon, 2013 and Craver, 2020 for relevant discussions). Therefore, if premise 1 is true, then mEE‐K implies ETM.…”

Section: Memory Belief and Knowledgementioning

confidence: 99%

Memory belief is weak

Lai

2023

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In a recent influential paper, Hawthorne et al. (2016) argue that the epistemic standard for rationally believing a proposition is lower than for rationally asserting it. In a slogan: "belief is weak". Given the close connection between knowledge and the norm of assertion (as well as the norm of belief) in contemporary epistemological literature, this debate has been extended to consider whether belief is weaker than knowledge (see Rothschild, 2020;Schulz, 2021aSchulz, , 2021bWilliamson, 2020). Generally, epistemologists who advocate that belief is weak reject two forms of entitlement equality: EE-K: The epistemic standard required by rational belief is the same as for knowledge (cf. the knowledge norm of belief, Williamson, 2000). EE-A:The epistemic standard required by rational belief is the same as for assertion (cf. the knowledge norm of assertion, Williamson, 2000).

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“…As far as what is variously described as propositional, semantic or factual memory is concerned, the idea that memory should be defined as the retention of knowledge in fact has a long history (see, e.g., Annis 1980;Ayer, 1956;Malcolm, 1963;Naylor, 1971;Zemach, 1968). For discussions of 'epistemic theories of memory' in this sense, see, e.g., James (2017) and Adams (2011).…”

Section: The Target Explanandummentioning

confidence: 99%

“…to that question, the question itself needs to be distinguished from questions about the neural underpinnings of episodic memory (see also James 2017).…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

A knowledge-first approach to episodic memory

Hoerl

2022

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This paper aims to outline, and argue for, an approach to episodic memory broadly in the spirit of knowledge-first epistemology. I discuss a group of influential views of epsiodic memory that I characterize as ‘two-factor accounts’, which have both proved popular historically (e.g., in the work of Hume, 1739-40; Locke 1690; and Russell 1921) and have also seen a resurgence in recent work on the philosophy of memory (see, e.g., Dokic 2014; Michaelian, 2016; Owens, 1996). What is common to them is that they try to give an account of the nature of episodic memory in which the concept of knowledge plays no explanatory role. I highlight some parallels between these two-factor accounts and attempts to give a reductive definition of knowledge itself. I then discuss some problems two-factor accounts of episodic memory face in explaining the distinctive sense in which episodic recollection involves remembering personally experienced past events, before sketching an alternative approach to episodic memory, which takes as basic the idea that episodic memory involves the retention of knowledge. I argue that we can give an exhaustive constitutive account of what episodic memory is, and how it differs from other types of mental states, by considering what particular type of knowledge is retained in episodic memory, and what exactly having that knowledge consists in.

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Epistemic and non‐Epistemic Theories of Remembering

Cited by 10 publications

References 54 publications

Memory without content? Radical enactivism and (post)causal theories of memory

Memory without content? Radical enactivism and (post)causal theories of memory

Memory belief is weak

A knowledge-first approach to episodic memory

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