Memory belief is weak

Abstract

In a recent influential paper, Hawthorne et al. (2016) argue that the epistemic standard for rationally believing a proposition is lower than for rationally asserting it. In a slogan: "belief is weak". Given the close connection between knowledge and the norm of assertion (as well as the norm of belief) in contemporary epistemological literature, this debate has been extended to consider whether belief is weaker than knowledge (see Rothschild, 2020;Schulz, 2021aSchulz, , 2021bWilliamson, 2020). Generally, epistemologists who advocate that belief is weak reject two forms of entitlement equality: EE-K: The epistemic standard required by rational belief is the same as for knowledge (cf. the knowledge norm of belief, Williamson, 2000). EE-A:The epistemic standard required by rational belief is the same as for assertion (cf. the knowledge norm of assertion, Williamson, 2000).