The Metaphysics of Henry More

Panentheism and Panpsychism

“…Throughout their correspondence, More bestows lavish praise upon the Frenchman whose natural philosophy surpasses all its rivals past and present. However, despite the admiration in which he holds Descartes' thought, there are a few »minor details« (paucula) on which More begs to differ from him.15 These »minor details« all bear on the core of Descartes' rationalism, 13 My appraisal of More's early and mature metaphysics is throughout deeply indebted to the detailed expositions of his thought in Reid 2012, notably his dualism of thought and extension and the question of how God, or any other incorporeal substance, can act upon matter and body without sharing the latter's defining attribute of extension and being present to it in some way. 16 In response to what he views as a fundamental weakness of the admired Frenchman's ontology and philosophy of nature, More, in the first exposition of his landmark doctrine, suggests that God must be viewed as »extended in his own way«:…”

Descartes’s Holenmerism: From metaphysics to phenomenology

“…Holenmerizam je teza da postoje entiteti koji su prisutni u prostoru na način različit od načina na koji su materijalna tela prisutna u prostoru. Konkretnije, holenmeri-14 O istoriji holenmerizma i primarnim izvorima javljanja ove pozicije od antike do ranog modernog perioda, videti (Grant, 1981), (Rozemond, 2003), (Reid, 2007(Reid, , 2012 (Pasnau, 2011: 337-8) i (Kochiras, 2012). 15 Videti (Rozemond, 2003(Rozemond, , 2014, (Pasnau, 2011) i (Anfray, 2014.…”

“…Enchyrydion metaphysicum I: 98. Videti i peto poglavlje(Reid, 2012). 4(Ryle, 1949: 11) 5 Strasti duše I.34 (AT XI: 355).…”

“…O nedimenzionalnom prostornom prisustvu videti(Kochiras, 2012). 30 O Morovoj metafizici videti(Reid, 2007(Reid, , 2012.…”

Samuel Clarke on Agent Causation, Voluntarism, and Occasionalism

“… 41 Clarke's acceptance of an intermediary spiritual agent may suggest that Clarke could be sympathetic to some form of Cambridge Platonism. However, the intermediary spiritual entities introduced by More and Cudworth are conceived of as hierarchically inferior (in terms of perfection) to human minds since they are deprived of reason, free will, and consciousness (on Cudworth's view of plastic natures, see Cunning 2003; on More's view, see Reid 2012, 313-348). Clarke maintains that “action supposes in the very notion of it life and consciousness” (Clarke 1998, 130).…”