2018
DOI: 10.1017/s0269889718000340
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Samuel Clarke on Agent Causation, Voluntarism, and Occasionalism

Abstract: ArgumentThis paper argues that Samuel Clarke's account of agent causation (i) provides a philosophical basis for moderate voluntarism, and (ii) both leads to and benefits from the acceptance of partial occasionalism as a model of causation for material beings. Clarke's account of agent causation entails that for an agent to be properly called an agent (i.e. causally efficacious), it is essential that the agent is free to choose whether to act or not. This freedom is compatible with the existence of conceptuall… Show more

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Cited by 12 publications
(6 citation statements)
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References 60 publications
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“…To what extent this is a genuine form of occasionalism falls outside the scope of this paper. For Clarke's relation to occasionalism, see Sangiacomo (2018).…”
Section: Will and Choicementioning
confidence: 99%
See 1 more Smart Citation
“…To what extent this is a genuine form of occasionalism falls outside the scope of this paper. For Clarke's relation to occasionalism, see Sangiacomo (2018).…”
Section: Will and Choicementioning
confidence: 99%
“…Harrison's claims soon led to a debate between him and John Henry (a defender of the voluntarism thesis). This debate is still ongoing, with recent contributions by Henry, Mcguire, Oakley and Sangiacomo (Oakley 2019;Henry and McGuire 2018;Sangiacomo 2018).…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…It can be seen just how far from being an occasionalist Newton was by comparing him with his close friend Samuel Clarke. Clarke has recently been convincingly revealed to be a "partial occasionalist" who believed that gravitational effects could only be brought about by the direct intervention of God, or by angels delegated by him (Sangiacomo 2018). In order to convince his readers that the direct intervention of God is required to make an apple fall to the ground, or to keep Saturn in its orbit, Clarke has to first demonstrate (at least to his own satisfaction) that material bodies are categorically passive and inert, and that not even God can endow bodies with active powers, such as the power of attraction.…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Mechanism does not inevitably lead to occasionalism: Pierre-Sylvain Régis (1632-1707) adopts mechanism but his causal theory looks very much like concurrentism rather than occasionalism (Ott 2008a). Samuel Clarke (1675-1729 endorses (partial) occasionalism, but he does not commit himself to mechanism (Sangiacomo 2018c). Occasionalism, finally, does not require introducing final causes into natural philosophy.…”
Section: Occasionalism Final Causes and Life In The Natural Philosoph...mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…162 Leibniz's critique of occasionalism has been sketched in the introduction to this dissertation. dissertation); and Samuel Clarke (1675-1729 accepts occasionalism and teleology (Sangiacomo 2018c). No thinker has been identified by academic scholarship who adopts all three features, that is, mechanism, occasionalism and final causes.…”
Section: Occasionalism Final Causes and Life In The Natural Philosoph...mentioning
confidence: 99%