2002
DOI: 10.1080/00036840010029476
|View full text |Cite
|
Sign up to set email alerts
|

The market for academic journals

Abstract: Library journal subscriptions are treated as a public good. A monopoly publisher sells subscriptions to both libraries and individuals. For individuals, the journal is a private good. Profit maximization can lead to high institutional prices and few individual subscribers. This outcome is reinforced by increases in publishing costs. Library serial prices fall if patrons pay access costs and/or there is congestion. Data are presented to support these conclusions. Library prices are two to ten times higher than … Show more

Help me understand this report

Search citation statements

Order By: Relevance

Paper Sections

Select...
2
2
1

Citation Types

0
7
0
1

Year Published

2003
2003
2020
2020

Publication Types

Select...
5
5

Relationship

0
10

Authors

Journals

citations
Cited by 20 publications
(8 citation statements)
references
References 6 publications
0
7
0
1
Order By: Relevance
“…As such, the bundling practices are both an expression of market power and a reinforcing factor for generating more market power. While market power is acknowledged by many studies of the market for academic publishing (inter alia, Bergstrom and Bergstrom 2004;Chressanthis 1994, 1993;Edlin and Rubinfeld 2004;Nevo et al 2005;Phillips and Phillips 2002), the variations of market power among the publishers depending on their size and portfolio is mostly neglected in the theoretical literature. In oligopolistic markets with heterogeneous firms (e.g.…”
Section: Theoretical Backgroundmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…As such, the bundling practices are both an expression of market power and a reinforcing factor for generating more market power. While market power is acknowledged by many studies of the market for academic publishing (inter alia, Bergstrom and Bergstrom 2004;Chressanthis 1994, 1993;Edlin and Rubinfeld 2004;Nevo et al 2005;Phillips and Phillips 2002), the variations of market power among the publishers depending on their size and portfolio is mostly neglected in the theoretical literature. In oligopolistic markets with heterogeneous firms (e.g.…”
Section: Theoretical Backgroundmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…While market power is acknowledged by many studies of the market for academic publishing (inter alia, T. C. Bergstrom and Bergstrom, 2004;G. A. Chressanthis and Chressanthis, 1993;Rubinfeld, 2004, 2005;Nevo et al, 2005;Phillips and Phillips, 2002), the variations of market power among the publishers depending on their size and portfolio is mostly neglected in the theoretical literature. In oligopolistic markets with heterogeneous firms (e.g.…”
Section: Theoretical Backgroundmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…In their study of the market of academic journals, Phillips and Phillips (2002) showed the segmentation of subscribers between institutions and individuals where a price discrimination of a third degree was evident. A study of the same market by Zheng and Kaiser (2012) found the price discrimination was centered based on distinguishing the publishers as for-profit and non-profit.…”
Section: )mentioning
confidence: 99%