The Logic of Insurgent Electoral Violence

Abstract

Competitive elections are essential to establishing the political legitimacy of democratizing regimes. We argue that insurgents undermine the state’s mandate through electoral violence. We study insurgent violence during elections using newly declassified microdata on the conflict in Afghanistan. Our data track insurgent activity by hour to within meters of attack locations. Our results suggest that insurgents carefully calibrate their production of violence during elections to avoid harming civilians. Leveraging a novel instrumental variables approach, we find that violence depresses voting. Collectively, the results suggest insurgents try to depress turnout while avoiding backlash from harming civilians. Counterfactual exercises provide potentially actionable insights for safeguarding at-risk elections and enhancing electoral legitimacy in emerging democracies. (JEL D72, D74, O17)

Damaging democracy? Security provision and turnout in Afghan elections†

“…Election violence has been a core concern for policy‐makers and voters in Afghanistan. Insurgent attacks against state targets during election campaigns and on election day are orders of magnitude higher than in non‐election periods (Condra et al., ), and violent spikes depress turnout. In the 2014 election, Condra et al.…”

“…In the 2014 election, Condra et al. () estimate that every election‐day early morning direct fire attack reduced district‐level turnout by 9%–14%, and a pre‐election improvised explosive device deployed on a road decreased the total number of ballots cast at connected polling centers by an average of 7,400 votes . Furthermore, the authors show that public opinion surveys indicate that exposure to this violence increased citizens’ dissatisfaction with the election process.…”

“…The first evaluates the impact of counterinsurgency efforts on rebel activity (Berman, Felter, Shapiro, & Troland, 2013;Biddle, Friedman, & Shapiro, 2012), echoing economic studies of the effects of policing on crime (Draca, Machin, & Witt, 2011;Levitt, 1997). The second literature comprises a host of studies that seek to identify the effects of election violence on voters' attitudes and behavior after terrorist and insurgent attacks (Berrebi & Klor, 2008;Condra, Long, Shaver, & Wright, 2018;Getmansky & Zeitzoff, 2014). Both literatures face the challenge of accounting in some way for insurgents' strategic adjustment in response to anticipated changes in force levels and locations.…”

Fighting for Votes: Theory and Evidence on the Causes of Electoral Violence

“…Electoral violence is a catch‐all term regrouping a wide variety of types of violent behaviour committed before, during or after elections by a multitude of actors (Matanock and Staniland ), from parties (Fearon ; Ellman and Wantchekon ) to insurgents (Condra et al . ), mafias (De Luca and De Feo ), militias (Acemoglu et al . ) and gangs (Dercon and Gutiérrez‐Romero ).…”

“…On election day, insurgents and other groups excluded from the democratic process may increase their attacks to undermine the rule and legitimacy of the prevailing power structures (Condra et al . ). After the elections, losing parties may challenge election results and coordinate protests or rebellion (Fearon ), which, in turn, can be severely quashed by the government (Hafner‐Burton et al .…”