The Link between Brain Learning, Attention, and Consciousness

Grossberg, Stephen

doi:10.1006/ccog.1998.0372

Cited by 322 publications

(155 citation statements)

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“…conscious-states that are not only not accessed, but not accessible and thus cannot be reported [38,39]; this is quite controversial [40,41]. Note that the distinction between feed-forward processing (which is not posited to be conscious) and recurrent processing (which is posited to be conscious) is also made by both the global-workspace and winning-coalition theories, where the recurrence in GWT is between sensory areas and frontoparietal cortex, and between different levels of the sensory (visual) hierarchy for the winning-coalition model, although this has not always been precisely specified; cortical recurrent processing clearly plays an important role for many contemporary theories of consciousness [42,43], as might recurrent processing between cortex and the thalamus [44]. …”

Section: (C) Local Recurrencementioning

confidence: 99%

A roadmap for the study of conscious audition and its neural basis

Dykstra

Cariani

Gutschalk

2017

Phil. Trans. R. Soc. B

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One contribution of 15 to a theme issue 'Auditory and visual scene analysis'. Subject Areas: cognition, neuroscience, behaviourKeywords: audition, auditory scene analysis, conscious perception, neural correlates of consciousness, perceptual awareness Author for correspondence: Andrew R. Dykstra e-mail: andrew.dykstra@med.uni-heidelberg.de A roadmap for the study of conscious audition and its neural basis Andrew R. Dykstra 1 , Peter A. Cariani 2 and Alexander Gutschalk 1 1 Department of Neurology, Ruprecht-Karls-Universität Heidelberg, Heidelberg, Germany 2 Hearing Research Center, Boston University, Boston, MA, USA ARD, 0000-0001-8075-6374How and which aspects of neural activity give rise to subjective perceptual experience-i.e. conscious perception-is a fundamental question of neuroscience. To date, the vast majority of work concerning this question has come from vision, raising the issue of generalizability of prominent resulting theories. However, recent work has begun to shed light on the neural processes subserving conscious perception in other modalities, particularly audition. Here, we outline a roadmap for the future study of conscious auditory perception and its neural basis, paying particular attention to how conscious perception emerges (and of which elements or groups of elements) in complex auditory scenes. We begin by discussing the functional role of the auditory system, particularly as it pertains to conscious perception. Next, we ask: what are the phenomena that need to be explained by a theory of conscious auditory perception? After surveying the available literature for candidate neural correlates, we end by considering the implications that such results have for a general theory of conscious perception as well as prominent outstanding questions and what approaches/techniques can best be used to address them.This article is part of the themed issue 'Auditory and visual scene analysis'. IntroductionHow subjective perceptual experience-i.e. conscious perception-emerges from patterns of brain activity is a fundamental question of modern neuroscience. Although relationships between neural activity and conscious perception have been pondered since the beginning of the mind-brain sciences [1][2][3][4][5][6], many have viewed the problem as scientifically intractable. However, employing increasingly powerful methods [7], recent years have seen a dramatic increase in studies pursuing the so-called neural correlates of consciousness, or NCC [8], defined as the 'the minimal set of neural events jointly sufficient for a specific conscious experience' [9] (e.g. the phenomenal experience of hearing a sound). This definition, in contrast with others that distinguish between the NCC and the NCCC (neural correlates of the contents of consciousness), subsumes both the 'preconditions' and content-specific processes associated with specific conscious percepts [10], acknowledging that all conscious experiences have content (though varying in richness [11,12], an idea also underscored by early auditory selective-a...

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Section: (C) Local Recurrencementioning

confidence: 99%

A roadmap for the study of conscious audition and its neural basis

Dykstra

Cariani

Gutschalk

2017

Phil. Trans. R. Soc. B

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“…If it is a tool, what is the goal that it enables? Some answers include: to create a unified and coherent representation of all incoming information (Crick and Koch, 1998; Merker, 2005); to enable the learning of sensory and cognitive representations (Grossberg, 1999); to make complex flexible decisions (Earl, 2014); and more. Consciousness is commonly considered a tool for flexible, context and memory-based cognitive behaviors that in turn are clearly adaptive (Seth, 2009).…”

Section: The Proposition That Consciousness Has a Functionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Mind-Evolution Problem: The Difficulty of Fitting Consciousness in an Evolutionary Framework

Gutfreund

2018

Front. Psychol.

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“…Already in the early 1980s, Grossberg [12] related conscious perception to a simultaneous and synchronous ignition of sensory brain areas by the bottom-up sensory stimulation, on the one hand, and by topdown activation from the remote high-level processing regions, on the other hand. Later on, Grossberg [13] generalized this approach into a broader theory of neurophysiological underpinnings of consciousness. In this vein, important neurophysiological findings were obtained indicating that conscious experience may be specifically related to re-entrant activations from higher-level brain regions back to primary and secondary sensory cortices [14][15][16] (see, however, severe methodological critique in King et al [17]).…”

Section: Arguments For the Unitary Nature Of Consciousnessmentioning

confidence: 99%

What kind of consciousness is minimal?

et al. 2014

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Most evidence speaks for non-unitary models of minimal consciousness. If these models are correct, patients with MCS may have, in addition to temporal fluctuations, a lower level of consciousness compared with fully conscious individuals. A still lower level could characterize patients diagnosed as unresponsive wakefulness syndrome (UWS). From this point of view, therefore, the difference between UWS and MCS is gradual rather than qualitative. However, due to methodological limitations of the available studies, the evidence for non-unitary models cannot be regarded as definite.

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The Link between Brain Learning, Attention, and Consciousness

Cited by 322 publications

References 85 publications

A roadmap for the study of conscious audition and its neural basis

A roadmap for the study of conscious audition and its neural basis

The Mind-Evolution Problem: The Difficulty of Fitting Consciousness in an Evolutionary Framework

What kind of consciousness is minimal?

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