The Limits of Judicial Independence: A Model with Illustration from Venezuela under Chávez

Taylor, Matthew M.

doi:10.1017/s0022216x14000017

Cited by 18 publications

(11 citation statements)

References 35 publications

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“…Given the interplay between agencies and across branches of government, autonomy is therefore politically determined. As a result, the common practice of arguing that autonomy is solely the result of formal institutional protections, such as budgetary independence, appointment procedures, or mechanisms of policy review, has been shown to be inadequate (Taylor, 2014).…”

Section: Institutional Autonomymentioning

confidence: 99%

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The Political Economy of Statistical Capacity: A Theoretical Approach

Taylor¹

2016

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Any dispute related to the use of the works of the IDB that cannot be settled amicably shall be submitted to arbitration pursuant to the UNCITRAL rules. The use of the IDB's name for any purpose other than for attribution, and the use of IDB's logo shall be subject to a separate written license agreement between the IDB and the user and is not authorized as part of this CC-IGO license. Note that link provided above includes additional terms and conditions of the license.

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Section: Institutional Autonomymentioning

confidence: 99%

“…A dynamic model of central bank independence can be found in Eijffinger and Hoeberichts (2002). An application of the model to courts can be found in Taylor (2014). economy or specific aspects of national development.…”

Section: De Facto Protectionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Political Economy of Statistical Capacity: A Theoretical Approach

Taylor¹

2016

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“…While these features are not exhaustive, they are essential to the proper functioning of any agency (see Domingo 2000;Taylor 2014). The rules guiding appointment and tenure could present ombudsmen with greater freedom from the executive, as they do with a variety of other government agencies in democratic settings (Domingo 2000;Dull and Roberts 2009;McCarty 2004).…”

Section: Institutional Determinants Of Ombudsman Behaviormentioning

confidence: 99%

The Power of the Pen: Human Rights Ombudsmen and Personal Integrity Violations in Latin America, 1982-2006.

Moreno¹,

Witmer²

2015

Hum Rights Rev

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Recent scholarship has focused on the effects of institutional design and constitutional provisions on human rights protections. Democratic institutions, like other manifestations of credible commitment to human rights, seem to play a role in human rights provisions across the world. Yet, there is still a great deal that we do not know about domestic institutions like the human rights ombudsman, an institution created specifically to protect human rights, on human rights provisions. We conduct an examination of the effects of the human rights ombudsman (which may go by the name Defensor del Pueblo, Procurador de Derechos Humanos, or Comisionado Nacional de Derechos Humanos), on personal integrity violations across Latin America, 1982America, -2006. We find evidence that this understudied institution had significant and positive impacts on reducing such violations.

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“…In part, this omission could be explained by the fact that the ombudsman is a nonsanctioning body. After all, if sanctioning authorities have proven themselves lackluster (see Rios‐Figeroa, ; Taylor, ; Taylor & Buranelli, ) when it comes to fighting corruption in the region, why should we expect an agency like the ombuds to do better?…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Improving the Democratic Brand Through Institution Building: Ombudsmen and Corruption in Latin America, 2000–2011

Moreno¹

2016

Latin American Policy

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A growing body of literature has emerged that examines the contributions of mid-level institutions of accountability (e.g., public ministries, federal police, and electoral courts) in curbing corruption. Notably absent here is the Defensor del Pueblo (ombudsman). This study posits that, under the right conditions, these nonsanctioning bodies have several tools at their disposal that can be leveraged against state actors to reduce corruption. The ombudsman's unique links to the public (or principal) and external actors allow it to function like a "fourth estate," but the strength of the office to act as an effective deterrent to corruption is endogenous to the system and actors that created this office. This study conducts a two-stage least squares regression analysis for 17 Latin American countries (2000)(2001)(2002)(2003)(2004)(2005)(2006)(2007)(2008)(2009)(2010)(2011), provides support for these expectations, and suggests that the ombudsman is beginning to deliver on its promise, at least with respect to corruption.Los estudios sobre la corrupci on se han enfocado en las contribuciones de las instituciones de nivel medio (por ejemplo: ministerios p ublicos, la polic ıa federal, y las cortes electorales). No se ha tomado en cuenta el papel jugado por la Defensor ıa del Pueblo. Este estudio propone que, bajo las condiciones apropiadas, la Defensor ıa, una agencia que no tiene el poder de sancionar legalmente, puede usar varias herramientas para disminuir la corrupci on pol ıtica. La Defensor ıa funciona como el 'cuarto poder' ("fourth estate") porque mantiene nexos unicos con el p ublico (el principal) y los actores externos. Sin embargo, el poder de la Defensor ıa para combatir la corrupci on es end ogeno al sistema pol ıtico. Este estudio examina a las contribuciones de la Defensor ıa usando una regresi on de dos fases para 17 pa ıses latinoamericanos (2000-2011) y concluye que esta agencia est a empezando a tener un impacto positivo cuando se trata de la corrupci on pol ıtica.

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The Limits of Judicial Independence: A Model with Illustration from Venezuela under Chávez

Cited by 18 publications

References 35 publications

The Political Economy of Statistical Capacity: A Theoretical Approach

The Political Economy of Statistical Capacity: A Theoretical Approach

The Power of the Pen: Human Rights Ombudsmen and Personal Integrity Violations in Latin America, 1982-2006.

Improving the Democratic Brand Through Institution Building: Ombudsmen and Corruption in Latin America, 2000–2011

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