The Limits of a Global Campaign against Corruption

Why Anticorruption Reforms Fail—Systemic Corruption as a Collective Action Problem

“…While at the rhetoric level, much has been said about fitting anticorruption reforms to specific country settings, the most frequent approach has until today been to use the “tool kits” of ideas provided by the international community in line with the logic of a “one‐size‐fits‐all” approach (Kpundeh 2004, 127). More specifically, as a large number of researchers before us have demonstrated, anticorruption efforts in most developing countries have commonly followed the logic of principal–agent theory (Andvig and Fjeldstad 2001; Ivanov 2007; Johnston 2005; Lawson 2009; Riley 1998).…”

“…Hence, the policy instruments used have primarily been designed to influence the number of transactions over which public officials at various levels have discretion, the value of the bribes offered (i.e., the scope of gains from each transaction), the probability of being detected, as well as the loss incurred by being detected (i.e., the penalty for corrupt activities) (Klitgaard 1988; Shah 2007). In particular, to “close the loopholes for corruption” (UNDP 2004, 9), the international community prescribes a “holistic anticorruption strategy,” targeted at reducing discretion of public officials through privatization, deregulation, and meritocratic recruitment; reducing monopoly by promoting political and economic competition; increasing accountability by supporting democratization and increased public awareness (for political accountability) and bureaucratization (for administrative accountability); improving salaries of public officials, thereby increasing the opportunity cost of corruption if detected; improving the rule of law so that corrupt bureaucrats and politicians can be prosecuted and punished; and encouraging greater transparency of government decision making through deepening decentralization, increased public oversight through parliament, an independent media, as well as through the creation and encouragement of civil society watchdogs (Galtung 1998; Ivanov 2007; Langseth, Stapenhurst, and Pope 1999; Lawson 2009; Transparency International 2000; UN 2004; UNDP 2004; World Bank 2000). In sum, the contemporary global anticorruption agenda involves a large number of institutional reforms aimed at reducing the opportunities and incentives for corruption in line with the logic of the principal–agent framework.…”

Contested meanings in the anti-corruption discourse: international and local narratives in the case of Paraguay

“…Several scholars assert, for instance, that the project of fighting corruption has so far not been very successful on a global scale (Bukovansky 2006;Bracking and Ivanov 2007, 295;Rothstein 2011). 2 Another critique, which is the starting point of this paper, states that the INTACD imposes a universalistic and yet Eurocentric concept of corruption on countries of the global South (Polzer 2001;Bratsis 2003;Hindess 2005;Ivanov 2007;Hansen 2011). This happens through various implicit assumptions made by the INTACD, for instance, the division between the private and the public sphere in modern statehood.…”

Turkey and Europe: culture, capital and corruption

“…46 'Such lenience was openly shared by Western businesses and governments, which turned a blind eye in order to secure lucrative deals'. 47 Indeed, many writers believed that corruption was an inevitable corollary of modernisation which could, in some instances, overcome public sector inertia, assist in social integration and promote economic development. By removing rigidities that tend to obstruct investment, by augmenting salaries, thus allowing governments to reduce tax burdens and by promoting time efficiencies, the payment of bribes could, it was suggested, 'assist in capital formation, foster entrepreneurial abilities and allow business interests to penetrate bureaucracy'.…”