The Lebanese Army: Saviour of the Republic?

Revisiting the semi-consociational model: Democratic failure in prewar Lebanon and post-invasion Iraq

“…Nevertheless, in deeply divided societies, the commander in chief may use the armed forces to deploy the army within the country for political purposes, and historical events prove this point. In 1952, President Bchara al-Khoury ordered army commander Fouad Shihab to end the strike of the opposition by force, an order that Shihab refused to execute in order to preserve the unity and integrity of the army (Aboultaif, 2016: 72). Then in 1958, Shihab again was ordered to use the army to crush the militant opposition to President Kamil Shamoun.…”

“…Shihab refused to do so, on the grounds that the army would collapse and disintegrate along confessional lines (Barak, 2009: 55). Nevertheless in 1975, President Franjiyeh used the army to subdue the opposition and the Palestinian guerrillas (Barak, 2009: 95; Aboultaif, 2016: 74). Consequently, since the army command was dominated by Christians, its intervention against the Palestinians and its deployment in Muslim regions (Said and Tripoli), created a legitimacy crisis for the armed forces, that ended up taking sides with the Christian militias (Aboultaif, 2016: 74).…”

“…Nevertheless in 1975, President Franjiyeh used the army to subdue the opposition and the Palestinian guerrillas (Barak, 2009: 95; Aboultaif, 2016: 74). Consequently, since the army command was dominated by Christians, its intervention against the Palestinians and its deployment in Muslim regions (Said and Tripoli), created a legitimacy crisis for the armed forces, that ended up taking sides with the Christian militias (Aboultaif, 2016: 74). The point of no return came when the Christian militias expelled the Palestinians from the Maslakh camp, which led to the Muslim expulsion of the Christian population of Damur (Aboultaif, 2016).…”