The Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF): A United Army for a Divided Country?

Knudsen, Are; Gade, Tine

doi:10.1007/978-3-319-55167-8_1

Cited by 3 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 12 publications

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“…Salloukh et al 2017;Fakhoury Mühlbacher 2009). Fragmented security politics is often used as an indicator of this 'weak' state of affairs (Knudsen and Gade 2017). In this image, security agenciesnotably the Army (Lebanese Armed Forces -LAF), the Police (International Security Forces -ISF), the internal security agency (General Security -GS) and the state intelligence agency (State Security Directorate -SSD)are co-opted by their sectarian leadership, and the relative position between them is constantly contested and negotiated (Nerguizian 2015).…”

Section: Assembling Security Force Assistance In Lebanonmentioning

confidence: 99%

Practices of Intervention: Assembling Security Force Assistance in Lebanon

Tholens

2021

Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding

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Section: Assembling Security Force Assistance In Lebanonmentioning

confidence: 99%

Practices of Intervention: Assembling Security Force Assistance in Lebanon

Tholens

2021

Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding

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“…The Lebanese army is a multi-confessional entity and national symbol of unity and neutrality in a deeply divided country (Knudsen and Gade 2017b). The army is the state's last resort amidst repeated government collapse and state failure, yet carefully protects its unaligned role.…”

Section: Army Crackdownmentioning

confidence: 99%

Competitive clientelism in secondary cities: urban ecologies of resistance in Lebanon

Knudsen

2020

Third World Thematics: A TWQ Journal

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This article analyses political and religious mobilisation in Sidon and Tripoli, both secondary cities struggling amidst deep social divisions, elite competition, and armed conflict during the contentious decade following the assassination of former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri . A central element in the sectarian and Islamic resurgence was discontent with the political and social decline of the Sunnis. The Syrian revolt magnified Sunni-Shia tensions and shifted the locus of contentious politics from the capital Beirut to secondary cities such as Tripoli and Sidon. In both cities, communal tensions spurred confrontations with the Army that were followed by closely contested municipal elections. By examining the urban ecologies of resistance, the article contributes to an understanding of how urban inequality, competitive clientelism, and Islamist (social) movements are intertwined and can explain why the political pathways and electoral outcomes differed and the implications for the understanding of religious-influenced politics. The city-level analysis testifies to the importance of contextual urban traits and political actors' agency in influencing the popular support for stateoriented social movements and sectarian parties and as determinants of their electoral fortunes.

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“…A final important note regarding the control of the armed forces is the ability of the head of executives to establish intelligence units that report directly to them. In Lebanon, President Fouad Shihab established the deuxieme bureau (military intelligence unit) that played an important role in politics from 1958 until 1970 (Knudsen, 2014: 2). The deuxieme bureau – especially after the failed coup in 1961 – heavily intervened in parliamentary elections, assisting specific candidates supportive of the president while working at the same time against Shihab’s opponents (Barak, 2009: 67).…”

Section: Communal Control Of the Armed Forcesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Revisiting the semi-consociational model: Democratic failure in prewar Lebanon and post-invasion Iraq

Aboultaif

2019

International Political Science Review

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This article revisits the concept of semi-consociational democracy and distinguishes it from full consociationalism. Semi-consociationalism features just two of the characteristics of full consociationalism, proportionality and segmental autonomy, and exists without strong grand coalitions and veto powers. The case studies of prewar Lebanon and post-invasion Iraq demonstrate this new category of power sharing, which relies on three conditions: concentration of executive powers in the presidential office (prewar Lebanon) or premiership (post-invasion Iraq), communal hegemony in the system, and communal control over the armed forces. Full consociationalism then is mistakenly blamed for democratic failure in these two case studies.

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The Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF): A United Army for a Divided Country?

Cited by 3 publications

References 12 publications

Practices of Intervention: Assembling Security Force Assistance in Lebanon

Practices of Intervention: Assembling Security Force Assistance in Lebanon

Competitive clientelism in secondary cities: urban ecologies of resistance in Lebanon

Revisiting the semi-consociational model: Democratic failure in prewar Lebanon and post-invasion Iraq

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