The Labor of Judging: Examining Administrative Law Judge Decisions

Abstract

There has been significant scholarly research on judicial decision making and bureaucratic control but little research on bureaucrats who perform a judicial function, namely, administrative law judges. In this article, we analyze the influences on the decisions of administrative law judges (ALJs) from 1991 to 2006. Using ordered logit, we examine the influence of policy preference and hierarchical and political constraint. We find that ALJs are comparable to Federal District Court judges in that they use ideology in their rulings, are also subject to hierarchical control by higher courts, and that they are constrained by separation of powers influences.

The Influence of Administrative Law Judge and Political Appointee Decisions on Appellate Courts in National Labor Relations Board Cases

“…In addition to increased expertise, ALJs are comparatively less politically motivated than Board members. Although recent work by Taratoot and Howard () demonstrates that ALJs at the NLRB are not politically neutral in their decision making, ALJs are perceived by appellate courts as being less influenced by political considerations. ALJs are selected through specialized merit exams for ALJs by the Office of Personnel Management, while political appointees receive their positions through traditional spoils.…”

“…Cooke and Gautschi (1982) were the first to acknowledge the importance of split decisions in Board decision making. Subsequent studies on the NLRB have used this coding as well (see Taratoot 2013;Taratoot and Howard 2011). Scholars in judicial politics have also begun to recognize and study split decisions (see Lindquist, Martinek, and Hettinger 2007).…”

Administrative Law Judges in Fair Housing Enforcement: Attitudes, Case Facts, and Political Control

“…Beyond determining the effects of attitudes on judicial behavior, attitudinal theory often posits that judges’ independence and insulation from political pressures actually permits personal policy preferences to have a potentially powerful influence on judicial outcomes (Rohde and Spaeth, :72). Similarly, ALJs have a significant degree of independence and insulation from agency pressures (Taratoot and Howard, ). According to Schill (:172), the independence of ALJs is reflected in the fact that they enjoy the protections of the Administrative Procedure Act; the Office of Personnel Management, instead of their employing agency, determines their salaries; and they may be fired only for good cause, which the Merit Systems Protection Board determines.…”

“…Although Article III judges are political appointees who are nominated by the president and confirmed by the Senate, often along partisan and ideological lines, ALJs are employees of the federal bureaucracy appointed through a merit system based on competitive examinations. Yet like Article III judges, ALJs enjoy significant judicial independence, and are insulated substantially from the political branches of government, and this allows them considerable latitude to decide cases based on personal attitudinal considerations (Taratoot and Howard, )…”

Administrative Law Judges and Politics

“…While the jury is still somewhat mixed, Taratoot and Howard (2011) find evidence that the role of an administrative law judge (ALJ) encompasses both bureaucrats and judges, at least with regard to the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB). On the one hand, ALJs are employed as bureaucrats and are encouraged to help ensure that individuals comply with federal agency regulations.…”