Administrative Law Judges in Fair Housing Enforcement: Attitudes, Case Facts, and Political Control

Seabrook, Nicholas R.; Wilk, Eric M.; Lamb, Charles M.

doi:10.1111/j.1540-6237.2012.00880.x

Cited by 9 publications

(5 citation statements)

References 15 publications

(28 reference statements)

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“…We measure the political partisanship of the immigration judges in our dataset (Judge Party) based on their party registration and/or primary ballot information found in statewide voter registration databases. This judge partisanship measurement technique, which has been used in prior smaller-scale studies of bureaucratic judges (Seabrook, Wilk, and Lamb 2013;Taratoot 2014;Taratoot and Howard 2011), is specific to the judge rather than being dependent on the appointing president or attorney general. Following the lead of scholars using commercial data sources on voters and public officials (e.g., Chyn and Haggag 2019;Einstein, Ornstein, and Palmer 2022;Enamorado, Fifield, and Imai 2019;Fraga 2015;Hersh and Ghitza 2018;Velez and Newman 2019;Yoder 2020), we use voter registration information developed and made available commercially through L2, Inc.…”

Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Yet, administrative judges-serving within the executive branch-enjoy no such autonomy" (Chand 2019, 397). This potentially opens up immigration judges to politically motivated attempts to manage and control their behavior in ways that do not happen with many judges who are not simultaneously judges and bureaucrats (Seabrook, Wilk, and Lamb 2013;Wolfe 2002).…”

Section: Judicial Behavior On Immigration Courts: Independent or Poli...mentioning

confidence: 99%

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How the Trump Administration’s Quota Policy Transformed Immigration Judging

BLASINGAME,

BOYD,

CARLOS

et al. 2023

Am Polit Sci Rev

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The Trump administration implemented a controversial performance quota policy for immigration judges in October 2018. The policy’s political motivations were clear: to pressure immigration judges to order more immigration removals and deportations as quickly as possible. Previous attempts by U.S. presidents to control immigration judges were ineffective, but this quota policy was different because it credibly threatened judges’ job security and promotion opportunities if they failed to follow the policy. Our analysis of hundreds of thousands of judicial decisions before and after the policy’s implementation demonstrates that the quota policy successfully led immigration judges to issue more immigration removal orders (both in absentia and merits orders). The post-policy change in behavior was strongest among those judges who were less inclined, pre-policy, to issue immigration removal decisions. These findings have important implications for immigration judge independence, due process protections for noncitizens, and presidential efforts to control the federal bureaucracy.

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Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Judicial Behavior On Immigration Courts: Independent or Poli...mentioning

confidence: 99%

How the Trump Administration’s Quota Policy Transformed Immigration Judging

BLASINGAME,

BOYD,

CARLOS

et al. 2023

Am Polit Sci Rev

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“…The first is when a civil rights agency engages in conciliation between the complainant and the respondent with the goal of reaching a settlement. The second is when the processing agency finds reasonable cause to believe that Title VIII has been violated and recommends that the complaint be submitted to an administrative law judge or another appropriate court for adjudication (see Seabrook, Wilk, and Lamb, ). The three outcomes that are not favorable to the complainant are (1) finding the claim to be unrelated to Title VIII, (2) finding that Title VIII was not violated, or (3) closing the case because the complainant could not be located.…”

Section: Data Method and Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

Fair Housing Enforcement in the South and Non‐South*

Bullock¹,

Wilk

Lamb

2015

Social Science Quarterly

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Objective We compare outcomes in racial discrimination fair housing complaints processed by southern state and local civil rights agencies to those handled by state and local agencies outside the South and the federal agency, HUD (Department of Housing and Urban Development). Methods Based on data obtained directly from HUD, we rely on a fixed effects logistic regression model with cluster‐correlated standard errors. Results First, southern local agencies are significantly more likely to provide outcomes favorable to complainants in racial discrimination fair housing cases than are local agencies outside the South. Second, state and local agencies in the Deep South provide favorable outcomes to the same extent as their nonsouthern counterparts. Third, southern local agencies are more likely to provide favorable outcomes than is HUD, whereas southern state agencies provide favorable outcomes at roughly the same rate as HUD. Variations within the South partially explain these findings. Conclusion We find evidence of progressive changes in southern fair housing enforcement, although those changes occur in an uneven fashion depending on the state or locality.

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“…The Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988 expanded fair housing protections to include persons with disabilities and families with children. It also strengthened enforcement by creating administrative law judges (ALJs) at HUD who decide, when conciliation fails, whether there is reasonable cause to believe discrimination occurred (see Seabrook, Wilk, and Lamb 2013).…”

Section: Intergovernmental Enforcementmentioning

confidence: 99%

Bureaucratic Effectiveness and Civil Rights Enforcement

Bullock

Wilk

Lamb

2017

State and Local Government Review

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This article compares federal, state, and local civil rights agencies’ effectiveness in enforcing the Fair Housing Act. Two factors primarily define effective enforcement: whether agencies’ conciliation efforts are more likely to lead to agreements between the parties involved in complaints and whether agencies are more likely to provide remedies to complainants in cases in which there is cause to believe discrimination occurred. The analysis shows that state and local agencies are generally more effective than the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) both at conciliating complaints and at providing remedies. HUD does appear to be more effective than state and local agencies in terms of the dollar amount of monetary relief awarded when successful conciliations occur, but HUD’s remedial effectiveness disappears after controlling for the likelihood of successful conciliations.

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Administrative Law Judges in Fair Housing Enforcement: Attitudes, Case Facts, and Political Control

Cited by 9 publications

References 15 publications

How the Trump Administration’s Quota Policy Transformed Immigration Judging

How the Trump Administration’s Quota Policy Transformed Immigration Judging

Fair Housing Enforcement in the South and Non‐South*

Bureaucratic Effectiveness and Civil Rights Enforcement

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