2009
DOI: 10.1080/14683850902723595
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The Kosovo precedent and the rhetorical deployment of former Yugoslav analogies in the cases of Abkhazia and South Ossetia

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Cited by 14 publications
(3 citation statements)
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“…This suggests that the international community's tying of state recognition to the status of victim of mass violence in the case of Kosovo coincides with a well-established preference for the avoidance of unilateral attempts at gaining independence. But rather than seeing the MASS VIOLENCE AND THE RECOGNITION OF KOSOVO 869 international community's arguments in the case of Kosovo as an attempt to limit unilateral secessionist claims to those situations where the physical existence of a minority group is threatened by the state, some scholars argue that they reinforce secessionist demands in Kosovo's neighbourhood and more generally in Central and Eastern Europe (Nielsen 2009;Berg 2009;Bardos 2008;Bandow 2009;Corten 2008). For these scholars, the recognition of Kosovo's independence on the basis of the violence suffered at the hands of the Serbian state opens a Pandora's box of similar claims by revisionist groups, particularly in other fragile Balkan states and in the Caucasus.…”
Section: Conclusion: Kosovo and The Prospects For State Recognitionmentioning
confidence: 95%
“…This suggests that the international community's tying of state recognition to the status of victim of mass violence in the case of Kosovo coincides with a well-established preference for the avoidance of unilateral attempts at gaining independence. But rather than seeing the MASS VIOLENCE AND THE RECOGNITION OF KOSOVO 869 international community's arguments in the case of Kosovo as an attempt to limit unilateral secessionist claims to those situations where the physical existence of a minority group is threatened by the state, some scholars argue that they reinforce secessionist demands in Kosovo's neighbourhood and more generally in Central and Eastern Europe (Nielsen 2009;Berg 2009;Bardos 2008;Bandow 2009;Corten 2008). For these scholars, the recognition of Kosovo's independence on the basis of the violence suffered at the hands of the Serbian state opens a Pandora's box of similar claims by revisionist groups, particularly in other fragile Balkan states and in the Caucasus.…”
Section: Conclusion: Kosovo and The Prospects For State Recognitionmentioning
confidence: 95%
“…The difficulties in defining the ‘people’ that should be granted ‘ self-determination’ may lead to inconsistent interpretation and opportunistic intervention by the international community. In this respect, a comparative look at the secession of Serbia’s Kosovo, Georgia’s Abkhazia and South-Ossetia and Ukraine’s Crimea is revealing (Hehir 2009 , Nielsen 2009 , Paech 2019 , 93).…”
Section: Federalismmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Most of the emphasis is instead placed on geopolitics, the issue of state recognition, or conflict resolution (e.g. Nielsen 2009;Ellison 2011;Coppieters 2012). This article, therefore, aims to better understand these dynamics and how they interact with, and are influenced by, their respective relationships with the Russian Federation.…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%