The Kindness of Psychopaths

Abstract

Psychopathy attracts considerable interdisciplinary interest. The idea of a group of people with abnormal morality and interpersonal relations raises important philosophical, legal and clinical issues. However, before engaging these issues, we ought to examine whether this category is scientifically grounded. We frame the issue in terms of the question whether 'psychopathy' designates a natural kind according to the cluster approaches. We argue that currently there is no sufficient evidence for an affirmative answer to this question. Furthermore, we examine three ways of dealing with the category of psychopathy. We could eliminate the category, revise it, or subscribe to a more encompassing account of kinds, which could capture psychopathy as it is currently conceptualised. We argue that while a revision of the category of psychopathy is to be expected with empirical and theoretical advancements, we also emphasise its role in clinical and forensic research, which makes it an important pragmatic kind.

Some Ethical Considerations About the Use of Biomarkers for the Classification of Adult Antisocial Individuals

“…These examples indicate that there are different subtypes of psychopathy that are likely to differ in their etiology. Importantly, these distinctions should be reflected in our classification systems, which would enable devising more effective and selective diagnostic and treatment tools, and public policies (Brzovi c, Jurjako, & Sustar, 2017;Gonzalez-Tapia, Obsuth, & Heeds, 2017).…”

Biocognitive Classification of Antisocial Individuals Without Explanatory Reductionism

“…These encouraging advancements, however, emerge within a scientific paradigm that is afflicted by the kind of problems associated with syndrome-based classifications. In fact, categories such as ASPD and psychopathy capture wide and heterogeneous groups of people, including individuals who often exhibit externalizing behaviors, affective deficits, and peculiar interpersonal styles, which themselves again comprise further subtypes (Brazil et al, 2018; Brzović, Jurjako, & Šustar, 2017). For instance, Brazil and colleagues (2018) wrote,This diversity in the classification of antisocial personality and psychopathy has led to a greater understanding of the need to differentiate between the two, but also to confusions and disagreements (especially after the introduction of the DSM ).…”

“…Lilienfeld et al, 2012). Although diversity is not a problem per se, in the case of psychopathy, it has often led to inconsistent empirical results within and across studies (Baskin-Sommers, Brazil, et al, 2015; Brzović et al, 2017; Jurjako & Malatesti, 2018b; Schultz, Balderston, Baskin-Sommers, Larson, & Helmstetter, 2016).…”

What Can Philosophers Learn from Psychopathy?

“…But psychopathy, as it is currently diagnosed, is unlikely to constitute a kind (e.g. Brzović, Jurjako, and Šustar 2017). For one, there is now general agreement that psychopathy comes in two types: primary and secondary, or low-anxious and high-anxious (e.g.…”