What Can Philosophers Learn from Psychopathy?

Abstract

Many spectacular claims about psychopaths are circulated. This contribution aims at providing the reader with the more complex reality of the phenomenon (or phenomena), and to point to issues of particular interest to philosophers working in moral psychology and moral theory. I first discuss the current evidence regarding psychopaths’ deficient empathy and decision-making skills. I then explore what difference it makes to our thinking whether we regard their deficit dimensionally (as involving abilities that are on or off) and whether we focus on primary or secondary psychopathy. My conclusion is that most grand claims about psychopathy settling long-standing debates in moral philosophy and psychology are overblown, but there is much to be learnt from this disorder when it comes to formulating modern theories of moral psychology.

Are Psychopathy Checklist (PCL) psychopaths dangerous, untreatable, and without conscience? A systematic review of the empirical evidence.

“…PCL-R psychopaths were physiologically hyporesponsive to such pictures relative to controls. Although Blair et al (1997) interpreted this as evidence of lack of empathy, Borg and Sinnott-Armstrong (2013) cautioned that results only suggested that empathic reactions were comparatively reduced and not lacking empathy as such (see also, Maibom, 2014; Maibom, 2018; Wilson, Juodis, & Porter, 2011). More importantly, meta-analyses of emotional processing (i.e., beyond empathy and guilt/remorse) have failed to find consistent evidence of hyporesponsivity in PCL psychopaths (Brook, Brieman, & Kosson, 2013).…”

“…More importantly, meta-analyses of emotional processing (i.e., beyond empathy and guilt/remorse) have failed to find consistent evidence of hyporesponsivity in PCL psychopaths (Brook, Brieman, & Kosson, 2013). Finally, one possible explanation for the lack of systematic reviews on empathy in PCL psychopaths could be that there is considerable variability in conceptual and operational definitions of empathy (e.g., Batson, 2009; Maibom, 2018).…”

Famine, Affluence, and Amorality

“…28 Landau (2000), Sinnott-Armstrong (2014), andSvavarsdottir (1999). Further, the following authors consider the possibility that there are actual amoralists, namely, psychopaths: Kennett (2006), Matthews (2014), Maibom (2018), Nichols (2002, Smith (1994), andSinnott-Armstrong (2014). 25 And this difference in intuition may be traceable to the fact that different people hold slightly different, largely overlapping concepts of 'moral judgment'.…”

Are psychopaths moral‐psychologically impaired? Reassessing emotion‐theoretical explanations

“…The problem is, however, that psychopaths are not fully deprived of emotion. Psychopaths may have emotional abnormalities in terms of deprivations and attenuations, but not full‐fledged absence of emotions (R. J. R. Blair et al, 2005; Brook et al, 2013; Maibom, 2018; Stratton et al, 2015; Venables et al, 2015). On a more obvious note, we know from other strands of research that people who cannot process emotions loses basic human functions (such as motivational impulses), which manifests in general paralysis (Damasio & Van Hoesen, 1983; Nagaratnam, Nagaratnam, Ng & Diu, 2004).…”